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PREFACE 
The purpose of this paper, as the title states, is to show the relation-
ship of William H. Seward to the lI'1'rent Affair". 
In order for the reader to gain a true insight to this problem, he must 
understand the background of the relations between Great Britain and the 
United states between 1860 and 1862. The reader must also be familiar with 
the public and private life of William H. Seward up to this time. To blend 
these two ideas into the subject, it was necessary for the writer in the 
introduction to mention the attempts of the Confederacy to secure their 
recognition as a nation by Great Britain and France; the attempts by the 
United states to prevent this recognition; and the place and attitude of 
Great Britain and F'rance towards the Confederacy and United States in 1861. 
In the second. chapter the author states the speeches, views, and be-
liefs of William H. Seward on matters which the author considered led to 
a feeling of distrust of Se~ard by Great Brit&in. 
The third chapter consists of advice to Seward from the friends of 
the United States in London at tre time of the Tren~ episode. It was the 
letters of these people which gave Seward insight and a dvice on the public 
opinion and attitude of Europe, mainly Great Britain, towards the Trent 
case. This advice, together with Sev,ard's viewpoints on the seizure 
helped to bring the affair to a peaceful settlement, and thus eliminated 
European military interference which might have proved disastrous to the 
North in the Civil War. 
-i-
ii 
Chapters four, five, and six do not require explanation in the 
Preface. 
If, in the reader's estimation the author neglected to mention other 
outstanding occurrences at the time, it was because the author felt they 
were either outside the scope of the problem, or not necessary for a 
proper understanding of the subject. . 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
During the first half year of the American Civil War, the policy of 
the British government toward the United States appeared to be one of un-
f 'dlin 1 rl.en esse In the summer of 1861, troops were sent to Canada by the 
British government. Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, re-
garded this as necessary because of what he regarded as disturbed conditions 
in the United states. The upper classes of England taken as a whole, were 
decidedly hostile to the cause of the Union from a variety of motives. 
Englishmen recalled that a century had not passed since the colonists of 
New England had demanded for themselves the right of separating from the 
Mother Countr;.l, and could not restrain a certain satisfaction at seeing 
the United states in trouble;2 dislike of American business methods and 
materialistic views was common, and had found expression in a novel of 
Dickens, Martin Chuzzlewit. In addition, the feeling among the upper 
classes in England was then in sympathy with a graded or aristocratic 
state of society, and it could see this state existing in the South in 
1 David Knowles, American Civil vvar, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1926, 73. 
Hereafter this work will be cited as Knowles. 
2 Message Of The President And Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, 1862, 60. Hereafter this work will be 
cited as Diplorratic Correspondence, 1862. 
-1-
2 
much the same way as in England,3 while the North had been in the habit of 
.. 
employing its democratic citizenship. For these and similar reasons, the 
majority of the English governing classes found their sYIT~athy transformed 
into enthusiasm by the early Confederate victories of the war, and by 
genuine admiration for the character of the Confederate leaders. 4 
In the North continued acts of unfriendliness such as the above, 
seemed to indicate a strong desire for recognition of the Confederacy and 
early intervention in American affairs by the British government. 5 In the 
South these acts were an inspiration and renewed enthusiasm for the 
Confederacy. 
From the time when secession began to be contemplated by the southern 
leaders, it was evident that they confidently expected foreign aid, both 
moral and material, i~ their efforts to establish their independence.6 A 
comparatively large and profitable commerce had been carried on for many 
years between the South and the nations of western Europe. It seems an 
exaggerated idea of the importance of this trade had impressed itself upon 
the minds of the secession leaders. They evidently believed that England 
would aid than in a war for independence which would be caused by a 
destruction of the cotton trade. 
3 James F. Rhodes, History Of The United states From The Compromise Of 
1850, Harper Brothers, New York, 1900, III, 502. Hereafter this work 
will be cited as Rhodes. 
4 Ibid., 502. 
5 Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, University of Chicago Press, 
·Chicago, 1931,13. Hereafter this work wlll be cited as Owsley. 
6 ~., 13. 
3 
These actions of the British government were brought under the scrutiny 
.., 
of the President and the members of his Cabinet. Secretary of State William 
H. Seward addressed a circular on October 14, 1$61, to each of the governors 
of the loyal states bordering on the Atlantic Ocean or the Great Lakes. 
The circular told of the attempts by the Confederacy to invoke inter-
vention by foreign powers against the United States. It further stated that 
although these attempts had failed, every precaution must be taken to insure 
the safety of this country.7 Seward warned that our ports and harbors on 
the seas and lakes should. be put in a condition of complete defense for "any 
nation may be said to voluntarily incur danger in tempestuos seasons when it 
fails to show that it has sheltered itself on every side from which the 
storm might come. ,,8 He added that bec~use Congress in its last session was 
chiefly absorbed during it s extra session, with r aisingan efficient army 
and navy, it did not provide as amply as could be wished for the fortifica-
tion of our sea and lake coasts. Thus, the states with the approval of 
their legislature should perfect the defenses of their state at their own 
expense and in his opinion would later be reimbursed by the Federal govern-
ment with the consent of Congress. 9 
This circular caused great comment both in Canada and England. The 
Canadian press declared that fortifications along the northern frontier of 
7 Frederic Bancroft, Life of Seward, Harper Brothers, New York, 1900, II, 
213. Hereafter this work will be cited as Bancroft. 
8 Ibid., II, 212, quoting Seward. 
9 ~., II, 212. 
4 
the United stat€s were a menace to their dominions, and would be immediately 
equaled by defenses which they proposed to erect.10 The London Times regarded 
the circular as a menace and pronounced it l1ill-timedrt , and lIa foolish con-
fession of fear" .11 At the time of the Tren~ seizure the London Times 
again began to comment and severely criticize Seward for his circular.12 
It is interesting to notice that Seward's circular was issued three days 
after the escape from Charleston of Mason and Slidell, the Confederate Com-
missioners to England and France. The objects of their mission had undoubted-
ly been well understood at Washington for some time, and this probably had 
something to do with the issuing of the circular. 
According to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, the federal govern-
ment at all times pursued a policy of the most determined and unyielding 
opposition to any foreign intervention in behalf of the insurgents.13 In 
the first important despatch to William L. Dayton, the new Minister to France, 
on April 22, 1861, Seward acknowledged the necessity of force to put down 
the rebellion. With the increase of danger at home, his expressions against 
foreign interference became stronger. Vfuatever else, the President might 
consent to do, he would never invoke or even "admit foreign interference 
10 Charles F. Adams Jr., Charles Francis Adams, Houghton, Mifflin, New York, 
1900, 225. Hereafter this work will be cited as Charles F. Adams, 
Charles Francis Adams. 
11 London Times, November 5, 1861,6. 
12 Ibid., December 2, 1861, 6. 
13 Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward, Sheldon and Company, New York, 1874, 
88. Hereafter this work will be cited as Vvelles. 
5 
or influence iB this or any other controversy in which the government of the 
United states may be engaged with any portion of the American people.14 
After indicating that he had no apprehension of unfriendly action on the 
part of France, he recorded this warning to whom it may concern. 
Foreign intervention would oblige us to treat those 
v~ho should yield it as allies of the insurrectionary party, 
and to carryon the war against them. as enemies. The case 
would not be relieved, but Qn the contrary, would only be 
aggravated, if several European states should combine in 
that intervention. The President and the people of the 
United states deem. the Union, which would then be at stake, 
worth all the cost and all the sacrifices of a contest 
with the wo1ld in arms, if such a contest should prove 
inevitable. 5 
The Confederate convention after its organization at Montgomery in 
February, 1861 adopted resolutions that stops be immediately taken to send 
agents abroad for the purpose of presenting the cause of the Confederacy 
to the governments of Europe. After Jefferson Davis was installed in 
office, he appointed as foreign agents William L. Yancey, of Alabama; Dud-
ley Mann of Virginia; P. A. Rose of Louisiana; and T. Butler King of Georgia. 
Early in March these men proceeded to their destination by way of New 
Orleansand Havana. They were empowered to secure the recognition of Con-
federate independence by European nations and to conclude treaties of amity 
14 Messa e Of The Pres:.dent And Di lomatic Corres ondence. 1861, Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 18 1, 199. Hereafter this work will be 
cited as Diplomatic Correspondence. 1861, quoting Seward. 
15 ~., 200, quoting Seward. 
6 
. 16 
and commerce wi.th them. Yancey and Mann were to operate chiefly in Eng-
land; Rost and King in France, although other countries were to be visited. 
Secretary Toombs instructed these emissaries that it was the confident 
expectation of t he President of the Confederacy that the government of 
Great Britain would speedily acknowledge Confederate independence and wel-
. h 1 17 tha "-come them among the natl.ons of t e wor d, and t it was no" regarded 
as within the range of possibility that the seceded states could be induced 
to reenter the Union. 
Yancey was primarily an orator and an agitator; he was a man of fas-
cinating manners; besides being a good representative of the slave-holding 
aristocracy.1S Rost was a Frenchman by birth, and like Pierre Soule, he 
ear ly gained distinction at the Louisiana bar, and became a judge of the 
supreme court of that state.19 It was expected that he could effectively 
address his countrymen in their own language about their interest in the 
Confederacy, and especially in talks concerning Louisiana. liIann had much 
experience in both the diplomatic and the consular service of the United 
States. It was he that was sent on a special mission to Hungary when the 
Whig and the Democratic politicians pretended to be so eager to help her 
16 Owsley, 52. 
17 James M. Callahan, Diplomatic History Of Southern Confederacy, Johns 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1901, 109. Hereafter this work will be 
cited as Callahan, Diplomatic Historz. 
is Owsley, 52. 
19 lli,£., 53. 
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gain independence. 
The commissioners reached London about the time that the fall of Fort 
Sumter was reported. There had been a great change in public opinion. Eur-
ope had watched the secession spread and had seen no marked check put upon 
the movement by the United states. As Seward wrote: "Disunion by surprise 
and impetuous passion, took the first successes, and profited by them to 
. 
make public opinion in Europe. ,,21 Many writers have taken more pains to 
formulate a grievance against Great Britain than to reach a fair understanding 
of the reasons for her actions at this time. The world knew that the seceding 
states were insurrectionary, and when Northern leaders like Douglas, supported 
by the official statement of the Secretary of State, said that such states 
could not be subdued, Europe and especially England, believed them. Se-
cession was so formidable and apparently so complete, that all but compari-
tively few Englishmen concluded that a war against it would be unsuccessful 
and therefore wrong. That such a man as Cobden shared this opinion is strong 
evidence that it was an honest conviction.2l According to Henry Adams, 
"This state of public opinion was natural, and not a subject for complaint 
so much as for correction. ,,22 
20 .Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 51. 
21 John ~orley, Life of Cobden, Chapman, London, 1881, II, 372. Hereafter 
this work will be cited as Morley. 
22 Henry Adams, "English Views TowarEis The Confederacy", Historical Essays, 
Houghton, Mifflin, New York, 1900, 269. Hereafter this work will be 
cited as Henry Adams. 
8 
On July 15 ~ 1861 Mann and Yancey "Wrote to Toombs from Paris, their 
thoughts, that all they could do was to influence public sentiment in an 
unobtrusive manner until some favorable event at home should furnish an 
occasion for them to press for recognition.23 On July 15, 1861 Yancey and 
Rost reported that Napoleon considered his European policy so important to 
France that he would "Wait to follo"W Great Britain's lead on the American 
t . 24 ques ~on. 
At this time Lord Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should 
be given the Southern Commissioners "When they arrived in London, but tha~ 
25 they be treated well. This he thought might open Se-ward's eyes to his 
folly. Still 4'ons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be so 
vigorous as his language seemed to imply, and on.March 29 he wrote that 
"prudent counsels" were in the ascendent, that there would be no interference 
with trade at this time, and that a quieter tone was everywhere perceptible 
in Washington.26 Yet Russell was not wholly undisturbed by the reports of 
Seward's quarrelsome attitude, for in a letter of April 1, 1861, he wrote 
to Lyons. 
I rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to 
steer us through the dangers of this crisis. If it can 
possibly be helped Mr. Seward must not be allowed to get 
23 Robert J. Bartlett, Record Of American Diplomacl, A. A. Knopf, New York, 
1947, 288. Hereafter this work will be cited as Bartlett. 
24 Callahan, Diplomatic History, 119. 
25 Great Britain Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers, Ridgway, 
London, LV, 549. Hereafter this work will be cited as state Papers. 
~., 551. 
us into a quarrel. I shall see the Southerners when they 
-. 
cOJ."ne, but not officially, ana keep them at a proper dis-
tance. 27 
It is an interesting query, whether this fear thus expressed of Seward's 
temper was not of distinct benefit to the United states at the moment when 
the Southern Commissioners arrived in England. The inference would seem to 
be clear, t~at in spite of Lyons' advice to treat them well, the effect upon 
. 28 Russell of Seward's attitude was to treat them coolly. It is of course 
uncertain how much Seward's threats had to do with the apparent moderation 
of caution of either government. Adams believed that Great Britain's in-
clination to enter into negotiations with the Confederates would have been 
yielded to in course of time, but for the warning which came from Seward 
against precipitation.29 !lIn lieu of the former rashness has come a pro-
portionate tirddity. 1130 
After spending seven months in Europe these agents accomplished nothing, 
but Jefferson Davis remarked that their efforts for recognition of the Con-
federate States by the European pow~rs in 1861, served to, "make us better 
known abroad, to awaken a friendly feeling in our favor, and cause a res-
pectf'ul regard for the effort we were making to maintain the independence 
of the Confederate States. 1131 
27 Ibid., 554. 
28 Callahan, Diplomatic History, 111. 
29 Charles F. Adams, Charles E'rancis Adams, 205. 
30 ill!!., 206, quoting Adams. 
31 Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, Appleton Com-
pany, New York, 1887, I, 469. Hereafter this work will be cited as Davis. 
10 
At this point it would be safe to assume that one of the chief motives 
which induced the Confederate government to seek recognition abroad was a 
hope that the United states would become involved in a foreign war as a con-
32 
sequence. If this was achieved they would then be able to form. a foreign 
alliance which would have greatly aided their cause. In addition, Confed-
erate victories during the summer and early in September strengthened the 
belief of the Confederates that Great Britain and France would soon be 
impressed by their military power.33 
Jefferson Davis determined to try the effect of a second and more for-
mal mission. The new representatives were to be commissioned as ambassadors 
for the Confederate States. James M. lIlason, of Virginia, was selected to 
represent the Confederate States in England, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, 
was to represent the Confederacy in France. 
James M. Mason had represented Virginia in the United states Senate, 
and While a senator was chairman of the senate committee on foreign affairs, 
and was author of the fugitive slave law. 34 He was one of the first to 
advocate the secession of Virginia. 
John Slidell, a native of New York, had in early life became a citizen 
of Louisiana after marrying a French Creole lady. He entered public life 
in 1842, being elected to the House of Representatives. 35 This man repre-
32 Owsley, 85. 
33 Rhodes, III, 502. 
\ 
Callahan, Diplomatic History, 131. 
~., 131 
11 
sented Louisi~a in the United States Senate when his state seceeded from 
the Union. The object of the mission of Mason and Slidell to Europe was 
to secure, if possible the recognition of the independence of the Confed-
erate government by the respective states to which they were accredited; 
to effect alliances or to conclude treaties of commerce or amity;36 to 
procure the intervention of France and England~ to neutralize and defeat 
any diplomatic measures of the United states in Europe; to serve the finan-
cial and military needs of their government by procuring foreign loans; 
securing munitions of war, granting commissions; and in short to aid the 
Confederacy by every means in their power. 
William H. Seward had anticipated the work of all Confederate agents 
abroad and had sent to each United states minister, accredited to any 
country which he thought would be applied to by these agents, a carefully 
prepared letter of instructions containing an outline of the arguments to 
be used in thwarting the efforts of the southern representatives. 
At this point I l'Ould like to mention a few of the instructions given 
to Charles Francis Adams, United states Minister to Great Britain, which 
were the most careful and extended of any. Seward thought the agents of 
the Confederates would ask recognition as a measure of retaliation against 
the Morrill Tariff. 37 He believed that England should not be in haste to 
36 Donald Eggleston, History of Confederate War, sturgis and Walton, New 
York, I, 295. Hereafter this work will be cited as Eggleston. 
37 New York Times, December 11, 1861, 2. 
12 
assume that th~ Confederate States would offer more liberal facilities for 
trade than the United states would be cisposed to concede.38 He also wrote 
that a recognition of the Confederacy would be equivalent to a British 
desire to see a prosperous nation permanently dissolved and the excuse for 
so doing would be only a change in the American revenue laws which could 
be only temporary because public sentiment in the United states would pro-
bably demand a change. 39 If war rather than peace should mark the existence 
of the new government, there would be very strong temptations to levy an 
import duty since that would be one of their chief means of raising needed 
4D 
revenue. Adams was also instructed to remind the British government 
that their Empire was made up of communities and possessions, some of which 
were held by ties no stronger than those which held together the Federal 
Union, and the time might come when England would be put to the same test 
as the Union. IlDangerous action on their part might set a precedent and 
invoke future retaliation.,,41 
Additional instructions were sent to Adams by Seward to supplement 
those already issued, and to keep Adams' perspective abreast with the 
American attitude. Seward hoped to persuade European nations to accept 
38 Ibid. , 2. 
39 Ibid. , 2. 
40 ~., 2. 
41 Ibid. , 2, quoting Seward. 
13 
his theory that the ~ facto sovereignty of the United states continued to 
... 
exist within the Confederacy, although the Constitution and all signs of 
federal authority--except in the Post Office Department which was carried 
on at the expense of the loyal people--had been superseded by Confederate 
control, and although it was repeatedly announced that there was to be no 
military coercion, no physical attempt to prevent the Confederacy from 
perfecting its organization at home in every direction. 42 From the be-
ginning he proclaimed with confidence that the resources of the United 
states would be adequate enough to meet every emergency, and that the 
panic had nearly passed. There must be no admissions of weakness in 
our Constitution, nor of apprehension on the part of the government. 43 
Suggestions of compromise must no be listened to, and if Great Britain 
should decide to recognize the enemies of the republic, she should also 
prepare to enter into an alliance with them. Our opposition to British 
interference was not to rest on the ground of any favor. 1\0 moral question, 
such as slavery, that might be supposed to be at the basis of the domestic 
conflict was to be brought into debate before the British government; for 
it was not to be forgottin that all the states must always continue to be 
equal and honored members of the Federal Union, and that their citizens 
throughout all political misunderstandings and alienations "still are and 
must always be one kindred and countrymen. n44 Above all the citizens of 
42 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862,36. 
43 lli£., 37. 
44 .lli:s!., 37. 
14 
the United st~tes and of Great Britain were of common descent, language, 
customs, sentiments, and religion. The government and people of Great 
Britain might mistake their commercial interests, but they could not be 
indifferent to their ambition for civilization and humanity.45 
These are a few of Seward's statements that warranted the conclusions 
of the London Times war correspondent, William H. Russell, that they con-
tained an undercurrent of menace and an implication that England might 
46 
wish to interfere. 
The United states were in fact, very weak, so far as making physical 
resistance to foreign nations was concerned. The thing best to possessing 
strength was to display a confidence of possessing it; for this would be 
a warning that if any power should yield to the temptation to intermeddle 
its actions would be promptly resented. 47 It was absolutely necessary to 
insist that the national integrity was only slightly impaired, and that 
the United states would demand and extend respect. Otherwise there could 
be no likelihood of preventing an early recognition of the Confederacy. 
45 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, 4. 
46 WilJ.iam H. Russell, My Diary, North am south, Harper Brothers, New 
York, 1863, 70-71. Hereafter this work will be cited as 'William H. 
Russell, Diary. 
47 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, 43. 
... 
CHAPTER II 
BRITISH DISTRUST OF SEWARD 
The British public, as distinguished from the government, deriving its 
knowledge of Seward from newspaper reports of his career and past utterances, 
might well consider him. as traditionally unfriendly to Great Britain. 
On I<'ebruary 11, 1852 in a speech before the United states Senate,< 
Seward said that the patriots of Ireland were suffering imprisonment to 
restore their native land to liberty and inde)endence and this interest 
was not merely personal,but that it was "reverential compassion indulged by 
the people of the United States for a fallen nation. ttl He reviewed the ten 
centuries of Irish wrongs, and declared as a climax, "that never on earth 
was a revolution more just or more necessary than that attempted by 
William Smith O'Brien and his companion~ in exile. 1I2 Seward viewed Ireland's 
misfortunes as living and crying, and England's offenses as unfortunate and 
inevitable; for he concluded this portion of the argument by saying: 
But, sir, on an occasion like this, Ireland is en-
titled to, and from me she has received her vindication. 
The policy of England was the policy of the age and of 
systems; and this is her sufficient apology.) 
1 Congressional Globe, 1851-52, 32 Congress, I session, new series, 
number 33, 525. Hereafter this work will be cited as Congressional 
Globe. 1851-52. 
:2 ~., 526. 
Ibid., 526. 
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It is a aonservative summary of Seward's various declarations to say 
that he believed it to be the duty of well-established republics to en-
courage and support, morally and politically at least, every rebellious 
or revolutionary people striving to found a republic. 4 All the leaders 
and their followers that might flee from the consequences of failure, 
and thereby become exiles should be welcomed by the United states, and 
. 
given a portion of our public lands. 5 
When discussing the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, Seward characterized 
Great Britain to be the foreign power that was lithe greatest, the most 
grasping, and the most rapacious in the world. u6 He continued that with-
out a war on our part, Great Britain would disappear fram this hemisphere 
within the next fifty years. 7 
The acqUisition of Canada by the United States had long been known to 
be one of Seward's favorite ideas.8 In February of 1861, Russell became 
suspicious of Seward's plans to incite a quarrel with Britain in case other 
plans should fail to reunite the North and South. It was well known that 
4 Bancroft. I. 327. 
5 ~., II, 52. 
6 Congressional Globe. 1855-56, 34 Congress, 1 session, new series, number 
19, 290. Hereafter this work will be cited as Congressional Globe, 
1855-56. 
7 Ibid., 290. 
Rhodes, III, 532. 
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Seward had spoken of this as a means of compensation to freedom for the 
acquisition slavery had made on the South. 9 In the debate about the 
fisheries in August, 1852, he said about Canada: ItI am content to wait 
for the ripened fruit which must fall. ,,10 
After he returned from Labrador in 1857 he wrote a letter saying that 
his previous opinion about the futuz:e of Canada was dropped as a national 
conceit. fIll 
I find them jealous of the United states and of Great 
Britain, as they ought to be; and therefore, when I look 
at their resources and extent, I know that they w ill be 
neither conquered by the former nor permanently held by 
the latter. They will be independent as they are al-
ready self-maintaining •••• 12 
On several occassions both before and ·after this time, he expressed 
confidence that the United states was to be the only power on this con-
tinent. This counter-prophecy of 1857 was soon forgotten, until during 
the ~ excitement it was brought .to mind and used to refute the charges 
that Seward had used against Great Britain by advocating the annexation of 
Canada.13 
9 William H. Seward, livorks of William H. Seward, edited by George E. Baker, 
Houghton, Mifflin, New York, 1884, III, 273. Hereafter this work will 
be cited as William H. Seward, Works. 
10 ~., I, 273. 
11 Frederick W. Seward, William H. Seward: His Life And Letters, Derby 
and Miller, New York, 1891 II, 319. Hereafter this work will be cited 
as Frederick W. Seward, Life and Letters. 
lli,g., II, 319. 
George J.vl. Trevelyan, Life of John Bright, Constable and Company, London, 
1913, 318. Hereafter this work will be cited as Trevelyan. 
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'William R. Seward was fortunate in having had much experience in dis-
cussing questions on foreign relations, for since 1857 he had been a member 
of the United States Senate committee on foreign affairs. Party leadership 
and his fondness for showy declarations and surprising prophecies had 
occasionally led him into saying unpleasant things about European monarchies. 
In a public letter in 1846, he announced that the monarchies in Europe were 
. 
to have no rest while they had a colony remaining on this continent.14 'When 
advocating a welcome to Kossuth, he maintained that this republic forever 
must be a living offence to Russia and to Austria and to despotiC powers 
everywhere, and also that they will never by humiliations gain one friend 
or secure one ally in Europe or America that wears a crown. 15 
To the doctrine of the natural equality of men as announced in the 
Declaration of Independence he added the belief that when one nation had 
established a government based on that doctrine, its mission was to aid 
every effort for republicanism and civil liberty in other parts of the 
world.16 He referred to Napoleon III as lithe youthful and impatient 
Bonaparte, the sickly successor of the Romans. 1I17 In 1856 he mentioned 
the treachery by which Louis Napoleon rose to a throne on the ruins of the 
14 viilliam H. Seward, Works, III, 4L9. 
15 Ibid. , I, 184. 
16 Ibid. , I, 175. 
17 William H. Sewarci, ~, IV, 562. 
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Republic and 1:113 pronounced the French Empire as a IIhateful usurpation. 1118 
In all Seward's dreams of territorial expansion was the expectation 
that they were to be realized by peaceful means, such as the quiet spread 
of population and ,the growth of commerce. In a speech of July 29, 1852, 
on the IISurvey Of The Arctic and Pacific Oceans", Seward set forth his 
opinions as to the duty of the nation to maritime interests and as to the 
functions of ,commerce in bringing the Orient and the Occident into closer 
relations. 19 He had reported from the committee on commerce a bill the 
purpose of which was to cause an exploration and the making of charts of 
those parts of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans traversed by our vessels en-
gaged in whaling or in commerce with China and Japan. 20 He was proud of 
the supremacy of American whale-fishermen, for between 1750 and 1824 
England paid her whalers fifteen million dollars in subsidies.2l He 
showed that the mos~ profitable fishing grounds were in the neighborhood 
of the Bering Straits where a large part of the exploration was to be 
22 
made. He continued: 
Who does not see that this movement of commerce must 
effect our own complete emancipation from what remains of 
18 Ibid., IV, 562. 
19 Ibid., I, 236. 
20 Congressional Globe, 1851-52, number 124, 1935. 
21 Ibid., 1935. 
22 Ibid., 1937. 
Eur.,ppean influence and predjudice and in turn develop the 
American opinion and influence which shall remold insti-
tutions, laws, and customs in the land that is first 
greeted by the rising sun? •• Whatever nation shall put 
that commerce into full employment, and shall conduct it 
steadily with adequate expansion, will became necessarily 
the greatest of exis~~ng states; greater than any that 
has ever existed •••• 
20 
Although England I s flag was to be met almost everywhere, "rooted into the 
24 
very earth, II claiming supremacy in continents, and whatever is most 
valuable in all the oceans, and although her commerce was advanced by the 
never-tiring steam engines and by her thoughts, language, and religion, 
Seward believed that the resources of the United states were abundant for 
competition with her. 25 
The recounting of two incidents that had occurred within a year greatly 
predjudiced the minds of the British Cabinet against Seward. In April, 
1861, it vvas rumored that the Confederacy had purchased the Peerless, a 
ship lying at Toronto, to be used as a commerce destroyer, and that she 
was to go down the st. Lawrence River under the British flag and be delivered 
to them as sea.26 Seward demanded that Lord Lyons should take immediate 
action to prevent this,27 but the British Minister explained that his 
relation to Canada made compliance impossible. Seward then declared that 
23 Ibid., 1939. 
24 Ibid., 1940. 
25 Ibid., 1944. 
26 Spencer Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, Longmans, Green, London, 
1889, II, 342. Hereafter this work will be cited asvValpole. 
27 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 106. 
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he would have ~he ship seized by United states naval forces, and without 
informing the British government he dispatched George Ashman to Toronto 
on an official mission. Lords Russell and Lyons inferred from this action 
that Seward thought he could overaWe Great Britain. 28 They entered their 
solemn protests. Ashman was recalled; the Peerless did not go to the Con-
federates; and perhaps it was Seward's surr~ry action that prevented it. 
The other incident concerned the Duke of Newcastle. When the Prince 
of Wales was in Albany, late in 1860, Seward remarked to the Duke of New-
castle that he was soon to be in a position where it would be his duty to 
insult Great Britain, and he would proceed to do so.29 The Duke took the 
remark seriously, and as Colonial Secretary reported it to his colleagues. 
The newspapers soon relayed the information to the British public. The 
Newcastle conversation stuck in the British mind as indicative of probable 
trouble when Seward became responsible for American foreign policy.30 Seward 
might deny, as he did, that he uttered the alleged words,3l and his friend 
Thurlow Weed might describe the words as ttbadinage ll , in a letter to the 
London Times,32 but the Newcastle story continued to be material for fre-
28 Walpole, II, 343. 
29 London Times, December 14, 1861, 6. 
30 Ibid., 6. 
31 Thurlov~ -iV. Barnes, Life of Thurlow Weed, Houghton, Mifflin, London, 1884, 
II, 378. Hereafter this work will be cited as Barnes. 
32 London Times, December 14, 1861, 6. 
a 
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quent comment in the British press and also in private circles. 
British Ministers would have paid little attention to Seward's speeches 
and remarks intended for home consumption, had there not been suspicion of 
other and more serious evidences of unfriendliness. Lyons was an able and 
well-infonned Minister, and from the first he had pictured the leadership 
of Seward in the new adni.inistratioI;! at ~Vashington, and had himself been 
worried by his inability to understand what policy Seward was formulating. 33 
On January 7, 1860 Lord Lyons informed Lord Russell that Seward would 
be the Secretary of State and had expressed the fear that with regard to 
Britain he would be a "dangerous Foreign Minister.,,34 It was felt that 
Seward's voice was sure to be a powerful one.35 On February 4, 1861, in 
a letter to Russell, Lyons reported at length an interview with Seward, 
in which the latter had expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble 
in America was but superficial and that Union sentiment in the South would 
soon prevail. In another letter of the same date, however, Lyons asserted 
that Seward was indeed likely to oe a very dangerous Secretary of State.36 
He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to protect their 
commerce, he could unite .~lerica by a foreign war in order to resist such 
33 Thomas W. Newton, Lord Lyons, .l.!;dward Arnold, London, 1913, I, 30. Here-
after this work will be cited as Newton. 
34 Ibid., I, 30. 
35 Ibid., I, 30. 
36 Newton, I, 31. 
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interference.~7 While himself expressing hope that a solution might be 
found for the difficulties in America, Lyons warned Russell that there 
were those who would solve these difficulties by a foreign war, especially 
if foreign governments refused to acknowledge a United states declaration 
without formal blockade closing the Southern ports. 38 Lyons exhibited 
great anxiety in regard to Seward's attitude and suggested that the 
best safeguard would be close union by England and France, for if these 
two governments took exactly the same stand in regard to trade, Seward 
would hardly dare to carry out 'his threat. 
Lyons' letter of February 4, 1861 called out from Russell an in-
struction in which it was repeated that advice to either party should be 
withheld and a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and Russell concluded 
by an assertion that if the United states attempted a jingo policy toward 
England, the British Cabinet would be tolerant because of its feeling of 
strength, but that IIblustering demonstrations ll must not be carried too far. 
Russell had foreseen, the possibility of what he considered a mere jingo 
policy for home effect in America. Now however, upon the repeated expres-
sion of fears from Lyons that this might be more than words, Russell began 
to instruct Lyons not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at 
the same time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American an-
37 Ibid., I, 33. 
38 Walpole, II, 317. 
L 
· 39 tagonl.sm. ... 
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On March 20, 1861 Lyons told Seward in a confidential conversation 
that if thw United States determinedto stop by force so important a com-
merce as that of Great Britain with the cotton-growing states, he could not 
answer for what might happen. 40 If a considerable rise were totake place 
in the price of cotton, and British ships were to be at the same time ex-
cluded from Southern ports, an immense pressure would be put upon Britain 
to use all the means in her power to open those ports. 41 On March 25, 
1861, Lyons gave a dinner for Seward and other foreign diplomats, and 
there Seward's violent talk about seizing any and all ships that tried to 
trade with the South, even if there was no blockade, made Lyons very 
anxious.42 
On April 1, 1861, Seward laid a program before the President entitled 
"SoIDe Thoughts For the President's Consideration. ,,43 The first half of 
the paper dealt with domestic policy and the latter part with which we are 
concerned, dealt with foreign relations. 44 It must be remew~ered that 
39 Newton, I, 39. 
40 Ibid., I, 31. 
41 Ibid., I, 3l. 
42 Ibid., I, 32. 
43 Thornton K. Lothrop, Willirun H. Sewarg, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 
1899, 254. Hereafter this work will be cited as Lothrop. 
44 Edward E. Hale, William H. Seward, George Jacobs and Company, Phila-
delphia, L10, 275. Hereafter t his work will be cited as Hale. 
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three days beiore the "Thoughts" were written, the newspapers reported that 
- a revolution had overthrown the Dominican Republic and had raised the flag 
and proclaimed the sovereignty of Spain. For some too it was well known 
that France, Spain, and Great Britain were considering the question of 
intervening in Mexico in order to stop the anarchy and violence detrimental 
to their interests. It was also rumored that a plan was developing to put 
a European prince upon a Mexican throne. The three European powers had 
not yet reached any agreement; and it was unwarrantable for the United 
states to assume that they intended to do more than enforce their just 
claims. As to Russia, the basis for demanding an explanation was to be 
found in the false reports in southern newspapers and in political circles 
in Washington that she was about to open diplomatic relations with t he 
Confederacy. That part of Seward's paper which dealt with foreign 
relations read: 
I would demand explanations from Spain and ~rance, 
categorically, at one. 
I would seek explanations from Great Britain and 
Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central 
America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of in-
dependence on this continent against European intervention. 
If satisfactory explanations are not received from 
France and Spain. 
Would convene Congress and Declare war against them. 
But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an 
energetic prosecution of it. 
For this purpose it must be somebody's business to 
pursue and direct it incessantly. 
Either the President must do it himself, and be all 
the while active in it, or 
Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. 
adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree 
abide. 
Once 
and 
( 
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~ It is not in my especial province; 
But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.45 
Lincoln's rejection of this program rid this note of its dangerous fea-
tures. '1'0 further explain, it must be remembered that Seward previously 
had stated that he deprecated war. In speaking on the Hungarian ques-
tion in 1852, he said he would never counsel war except on the ground of 
necessary defence. 46 As late as January 12, 1861 he stated in the 
senate that there is not a nation on the earth that is not an interested 
admiring friend of the United states. 47 At this time he seemingly ig-
nored all these opinions and was zealous to do what would be most cer-
tain to make enemies of great nations and justify their combining and 
attaching the United states. Thus, he desired to stir up a foreign war 
as the main-spring of his policy, itor it was the prerequisite of changing 
the issue. 48 Why in our critical o::mdition, it would not have sufficed 
to pick a quarrel with one foreign nation at a time does not appear, 
unless it was that he was so bent on speedily having a conflict of that 
kind that he sought it in several places. 
Seward's theory of the unifying effect of a foreign war can be 
45 John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Complete Works of Lincoln, francis 
Tandy Company, New York, 1894, II, 29. Hereafter this work will 
be cited as Nicolay and Hay, Works Of Lincoln. 
46 William H. Seward, Works, I, 202. 
47 Ibid., IV, 662. 
48 Ibid., IV, 662. 
27 
illustrated b:t, the following examples. At the dinner of the New England 
Society, he had declared that, if New York should be attached by a foreign 
power nall the hills of South Carolina would pour forth their population 
to the rescue. n49 In a speech of January 12, 1861 Seward declared that 
during the War of 1812 Jefferson had maintained that states must be kept 
within their constitutional sphere by impulsion, if they could not be 
held by attraction. 50 According to Seward, Jefferson added that secession 
was then held inadmissable in the face of a public enemy. 51 
Seward in his own mind believed the South had stronger ties to the 
federal government than to slavery, and that, if given time to reflect, 
they would not go to war in the interest of that institution. 52 He also 
believed that he alone could furnish and direct the policy by which the 
country was to be saved. His ambition was for the Union vastly more than 
for himself. 53 He s ought power and mastery of the administration, not 
because he wanted glory, but because he honestly believed that that was 
the way for him to serve and save the nation. 
On May 3, 1861 Lord Russell assured George M. Dallas that there was 
no disposition to t ake any advantage of the unpleasant domestic trouble 
49 Ibid. , IV, 649. 
50 Ibid. , IV, 653. 
51 Ibid. , IV, 653. 
52 Lothrop, 275. 
53 Lothrop, 258. 
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in the United States; but Dallas stated that English public opinion favored 
separation, and that it 'Was expected that W. H. Gregory, a member of the 
House of Commons, 'Would press a motion for the recognition of the Con-
federacy.54 Early in May, rumors of the issuance of letters of margue 
by the Confederacy, and Lincoln's declaration of a blockade, reached 
London. Russell requested Dallas to call, and informed him that the Con-
federate Commissioners 'Were in London; that although they had not yet been 
seen, he 'Was not un'Willing to meet them "unofficially", and that France 
and Great Britain had agreed lito take the same course as to recognition, 
'Whatever that course might bell, as Dallas reported. 55 About the same time 
Russell announced in the House of Commons that a British naval force 
sUfficient to protect British shipping 'Was to be sent to the coast of the 
United states; and that it 'Was the intention of the government to avoid 
taking any part in the American contest. 56 Se'Ward became greatly excited 
upon learning of the decision of Great Britain and France to act together. 57 
It plainly indicated an expectation that by joint action they could safely 
pursue the policy best suited to their political and commercial interests. 58 
The evident assUmption 'Was that their lead 'Would be followed by other 
nations, and that the United States 'Would not be able to resist such a 
54 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 81-82. 
55 Ibid. , 84, Dallas 
56 Ibid. , 84-85. 
57 William H. Se'Ward, 
58 
quoting Russell. 
~, II, 575. 
Diplomat, G. P. Putnam's ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'~ll~~be~cited as 
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combination of~forces. 
On May 17, 1861, Seward wrote that Great Britain was in danger of 
sympathizing so much with the South, for the sake of peace and cotton, as 
to drive the United states to make war with her, as the ally of the traitors-1 
The long despatch of :May 21, 1861 was the result. This despatch to Adams 
began with the declaration that our relations with European powers had 
reached a crisis, and that it was necessary for our government to take a 
decided stand on which Itnot only its immediate measures, but its ultimate 
and permanent policy can be determined and defined. n60 Stating that the 
United States was ready to meet such a war with confidence and success, 
he wrote Adams that the United States after long forbearance had a right 
to adopt a blockade as a means of suppressing insurrection, and that the 
treatment to be administered to Confederate privateers was a matter for the 
United States alone to decide.6l He also stated that every unofficial 
intercourse with the Confederates was hurtful1D the United States, and 
he added that Adams should desist from all intercourse whatever, official 
or unofficial, with Great Britain so "long as it shall continue inter-
course of either kind with the domestic enemies of this country. ,,62 Be-
cause the joint action of France and Great Britain had already been 
announced, but not put into practice, Seward doubtless inferred that a 
protest against it just then would be both ineffectual and unwise. Seward 
59 frederick W. Seward, Life and Letters, II, 575. 
60 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 87. 
61 Ibid., 89. 
further stated that Britain will do well to remember: 
... 
••• that in the controversy she proposes to open we shall 
be actuated by neither pride, nor passion ••• ; but we will 
stand simply on the principle of self-preservation, and 
that our cause will involve the6independence of nations and the rights of human nature. 3 
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Seward's plan was that Adams should give Russell a copy of this paper and 
then break off diplomatic relations with the British government, a rupture 
that should last as long as Russell continued to hold either official or 
unofficial intercourse tlwith the domestic enemies of this country.1I64 For-
tunately Lincoln struck out most of the indiscreet expressions, and made 
the whole despatch harmless by directing Adams to regard it as strictly 
confidential.65 Lincoln here acted as Seward's quide, and was to do so 
again, still more distinctly, in dealing with the Trent affair. 66 
William H. Russell, the London Times correspondent, in his diary said 
that the relations of the United states with ,England probably were consider-
ably affected by Seward's failure in his prophecies as to the early sup-
pression of thewar. 67 On July 4, 1861, Seward told Russell, the corres-
pondent, that if any European power provoked a war the United States would 
not shrink from it, and had nothing to fear from a foreign war, though it 
should wrap the worl in fire. 68 
63 Ibid., 90. 
64 Ibid., 91. 
65 Nicolay and Hay, LincC?ln's Works, IV, 470. 
66 Charles.i:". Adams , Charles Franci s Adams, 184. 
67 'viilliam H. Russell, Diary, 125. 
68 Ibid., 131. 
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iiilliam H. Ruasell could not but admire his confidence and coolness. Years 
later, Seward admitted that he purposely made these assertions to William 
H. hussell knowing that til ey would repidly reach the ears of the British 
Cabinet. 
Thus, the material presented in this chapter gives ample reason for 
the British distrust of Seward as the time of the Trent affair approached 
the scene. 
... 
CHAP'I'ER III 
FBIZNDLY ADVICE FROM: LONDON AND PARIS 
On November 27, 1861, the news of the seizure of Mason and Slidell 
from the deck of the British mail ship, Trent, and the transfer of the 
. 
Confederate emissaries into northern hands reached England. More will be 
said about the reaction of the British people am government in the next 
chapter. In this chapter will be emphasized the parts played by John 
Bright, Richard Cobden, Thurlow Weed, and Charles r"rancis Adams in infom.ing 
the United States government as to their interpretation of the reaction of 
Great Britain towards the seizure; and also their views, not only on the 
seizure, but as to the methods the United states should employ in settling 
the. affair. All four men were friendly to the Northern cause and their 
importance exists not only from this fact, but also that they were in 
London, and they were well qualified to give their views towards t he matter. 
In addition the viewpoints of these four men reached the ears of ·William d. 
Seward whose duty it was to guide the desting of the United states in 
foreign matters. The first person to be considered will be John Bright. 
By 1860 John Bright alone had shouldered the work to carry a real re-
form bill through Parliament. The hatred for him in England became so in-
tense that before the reform fight was finished Lord Russell was censured 
for even inviting him to dinner. In America he was the object of great 
-32-
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admiration, and was urged to visit t his country. Although he never came 
to the United states, he was probably one of the few English statesmen that 
had working knowledge of it. He sympathized with the struggle a democracy 
in the United States,l and he set out to give his countrymen a similar 
share in their government. As Barry O'Brien states: 
Bright had no faith in aristocratic institutions. 
He believed in government broadly based upon the people's 
will; and it was to secure 'such a government that he 
advocated the cause of Parliamentary Reform •••• It was 
Bright's policy to reform the system, and practically 
to transfer the government of the country from the 
privileged classes to the ma.sses of the people. 2 
John Bright took a very conservative view of the Trent case. At a 
public dinner given at Rochdale on December 4, 1861, Bright made a speech 
in which he said that he did not endorse the seizure of the Southern 
commissioners, but believed that it was an unauthorized act for which 
sufficient reparation would be made.3 He thought that the United states 
had evinced a great desire to be guided by wise and moderate consels in 
the construction of cases under the maritliue law. It had been asserted, 
Bright believed, that that this was one of a series of acts showing ill-
will on the })art of the North, but he believed that irritating accidents 
were unavoidable in a struggle like the present one and advised his 
countrymen to be calm. The noted pacifist reminded his fellow Englishmen 
1 Leonard V. Roth, IIJohn Bright and The American Civil War II , Old South 
Leaflets, IX, Number 2, 3. Hereafter this work will be cited as Roth. 
2 Barry O'Brien, John Bright, A Monograph, Smith, Elder, London, 1910, 
177. Hereafter this work will be cited as O'Brien. 
3 John Bright, A Friendly Voice It'rom England On American Affairs, pamphlet, 
3. 
34 
how they were .. dragged into the Crimean War, and suffered the ensuing penal-
ties of men, money, loss of trade, and the increased costs of European 
armaments. 4 He then reminded the meeting that large number of English 
people had recently emigrated to the Northern states, and that ~ople 
bound by such close ties could only be invloved in war by misrepresentation, 
and the most gross and wicked calumny.5 In conclusion Bright prayed that 
in the future it might not be said by the "millions of freemen in the 
North that in their darkest hour of need the English people, from whom 
they sprung, had looked on with icy coldness on the t rials and sufferings 
of their terrible struggle. 1I6 This speech was the clearest note of battle 
for the North that had been sounded in England by an Englishmen. 7 
His letters to Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, had much effect on American foreign policy, especially 
at the time of the Trent affair.8 On December 5, 1861, John Bright wrote 
a letter to Sumner in which he stated that if he were President of the 
United States, he would write a complete and capable answer to the case 
which would be written in a courteous and friendly tone, and then send 
this note to London. 9 If this note would not be accepted, then the 
matter would be referred to an arbitration group consisting of European 
4 Ibid. , 4. 
5 Ibid. , 7 
6 Ibid. , 14. 
7 Trevelyan, 313. 
8 
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10 government s. ... Bright firmly believed that if the seizure was not author-
ized by the United states, the difficulty would be smaller.ll He firmly 
hoped that the Unit ed states would act firmly and courteously. At this 
time, there wastalk in a British Cabinet meeting that the Trent seizure 
was arranged by kason, Slidell, Wilkes, and certain members of the United 
states government far the purpose of causing war between the United States 
and England.12 On December 7, 1861, Bright wrote to Sumner his belief that 
the United .::itates would be able to rJroduce strong cases from the previous 
actions of Great Britain in support of the seizure, but he doubted if the 
above action would change the opinion held in London.13 This important 
letter continued with the advice that the United States must put the 
matter in such a shape as to save its honor, and to put Great Britain in 
the wrong "if they refuse your proPositionll.14 Bright continued: 
I am looking alone to your great country, the hope of 
freedom and humanit y, and I implore you not on any feeling 
that nothing can be conceded, and that England is arrogant 
and seeking a quarrel, to play the game of every enemy of 
your country. l~ations in gre2tt crises and difficulties 
have done that which in their prosperous and powerful hour 
10 Ibid., 314. 
II Ibid., 314. 
12 Charles F. ddams, "Trent Affair", Proceedings of lIi...assachusetts Histori-
Society, Doston, 1912, 152. Hereafter this work will be cited as 
Charles f. Adams, kas~~~husetts Society. 
13 Trevelyan, 315. 
14 Ibid., 315. 
r 
theJ:.. would not have done, and they have done it 7;i thout 
humiliation or disgrace. You may uisappoint your enemies 
by the moueration and reasonableness of your conduct, and 
every honest and good ma.n in .i!:ngland will applaud your 
vdsdom. Put all the fireaters in the 1'·,rong, and Zurope 
vdll admire the sagacity of your government .15 
In t he opinion of the author, bright appears to be addressing and 
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giving advice to Seward rather than Sumner. Of cour se th e purpose of this 
correspondence was to enligh~en the United States and Great Britain on 
their actions and attitudes towards each other. Special attention must be 
paid to this letter, and the tone and contents of Seward's final answer to 
Lord .Lyons. 
On December 14, 1861, Bright again warned the United states that if 
it desired victory against the South to have no war with England.16 He 
advised the United states to make every concession rather than give Great 
Britain a pretence for aiding the South in the wirilling of "the war.17 He 
said that in case the demands by England cannot be complied with, to make 
an offer of arbitration or negotiation of s orne sort that will "make it 
impossible for our 'religious public' to support war."lS He believed 
that the mare generous and liberal the United states could be in their 
answer, the more difficult it would be for those people despising American 
15 ill9., 315, quoting Bright. 
16 Ibid., 315; also Charles F. Adams, :lvlassachusetts Society, 153. 
17 Trevelyan, 315. 
18 Charles F. Adams, llilassachusetts Society:, 154, quoting Bright. 
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Institutions to make war.19 
.. 
Richard Cobden also carried on a correspondence with Charles Sumner 
in which the problems existing in both countries were also expressed. These 
letters vindicate Cobden of the charge brought against him by his opponents. 
20 The charga concerned his being a disparager of his country. In arguing 
these points of international policy and law with Sumner, he never fails 
. 
to protest against the high-handedness and disregard for precedent to which 
a government fighting for its existence is always.prone. His judicious 
analysis of the change which public opinion in Great Britain underwent re-
gar ding the merits of the Civil Vvar and the prospects of the "Trent Affair" 
is even today of great value. The consistent support rendered by Cobden· 
and Bright to the Northern cause, and the evidence they presented to show 
that the democracy of Britain was heart and soul with the Union, went far 
to help establish better relations between Great Britain and the United 
states. At the beginning of the Civil War, Cobden did not realize the 
true significance of the struggle. Two of the reasons why his sympathy 
wavered between the North and the South were that he felt the North was 
the aggressor of the strife by attempting to prevent the South fran se-
21 
ceeding; and that the Southerners being slaveholders were .Free-Traders. 
19 Ibid., 154. 
20 William H. Dawson, Richard Cobden and lforeign Policy, George Allen and 
Company, London, 1926, 236. Henceforth this work will b e cited as 
Dawson. 
21 John Morley, Life of Cobden, Chapman, London, 1881, Ii, 373. Hereafter 
this work will be cited as Morley. 
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Here he came ~der the influence of John Bright who felt that the breakup 
of the United States would be a damaging blow to the cause of freedom all 
22 
over the world. From the time of the Rochdale speech, Cobden and Bright 
became identified with the support of the Northern cause. 
In aletter written November 29, 1861, Cobden informs Sumner that he 
can count on the support of Bright, himself, and all of their friends in 
the Trent episode, 23 but Cobden also' reminds Sumner th3.t the seizure will 
have little effect in discouraging the South, "compared with the indirect 
encouragement and hope it may hold out to them of embroiling your govern-
ment with England. u24 This letter mentions Cobden's lack of confidence in 
Seward, and places Seward in Cobden's estimation, in the same category 
as Lord Palmerston. On December 5, 1861, Cobden wrote to Sumner that he 
was enclosing a copy of John Bright's Rochdale speech, and conveys his 
interest in maintaining peace. He begs Sumner to send sopies of any 
documents or despatches; relating to private property, and concerning 
seizure, which have not been made public in Great Britain. 25 He feels 
convinced that the French Emperor would have the support of the French 
people if Napoleon III would enter into an alliance with Great Britain, 
22 Ibid. , II, 373. 
23 Ibid. , II, 390. 
24 Ibid. , Ii, 39l. 
25 John A. Hobson, Richard Cobden, '1'. F. Univirs, London, 1918, 346. 
Henceforth this work will be cited as Hobson. 
26 
and recognize the South. He continues: 
.. 
For ourselves in England, in spite of the bluster of 
the Times, the majority are anxious for peace. Do not 
overrate the power of the Times •••• Now its circulation 
is not perhaps one-tenth of the daily Press~ The star 
and the kanchester Examiner ••• circulate far more than 
the limes. But it cannot be denied that the great motives 
of hope and fear which kept us at peace and inclined the 
English Government always to recede in pending contro-
versies with you are gone. The English people have no 
sympathy with you on either side •••• fhere are two sub-
jects on which we are unanimous and. fanatical--personal 
freedom and Free Trade •••• In your case we observe a 
mighty quarrel: on one side protectionists, on the other 
the slave-owners. The protectionists say they do not 
seek to put down slavery. The slave-owners say they 
want Free Trade. Need you wonder at the confusion in 
John Bull's poor head? He gives it up! Leaves it to 
the Government, Which Government, by the way, is the 
most friendly to your Government, that could be found 
in England, ifor although Palmerston is fond of hot 
water, he boasts that he never got us into a serious 
war. As for his colleagues, they are all sedate, 
peaceable men. 
God bless us. riA mad world, my masters" 127 
39 
The noted historian, James F. Rhodes, does not agre1e with Cobden's 
viewpoint of the influence of the Times, but he does agree with the accurate-
ness of Cobden's remarkes on the British government and recommends that they 
28' 
be borne inmind. 
On December 6, 1861, Cobden mentions that he had read General Scott's 
letter, and quotes a liberal portion of the t ext. The gist of the quotation 
26 Ibid., 347. 
27 Ibid., 350; also Rhodes, III, 529-530, quoting Cobden. 
28 Rhodes, III, 530, footnote. 
I' 
of Scott's l~ter is that, although it would be a disadvantage at this time 
for the United states to surrender any of her maritime privileges, never-
theless the United b'tates will "be faithful to her traditional policy upon 
this subject, and to the spirit of her political institutions.,,29 The above 
quotation bears striking resemblance to a portion of Seward's note to Lord 
Lyons in which is mentioned the position of the United states in the 
"Trent Affair". The letter continues that if Cobden were in the position 
of the United states, he would release Mason and Slidell and demand the 
abandonment of the old code of maritime law upheld by Great Britain.30 
The reader must bear in mind that this letter was probably the last 
of Cobden's correspondence to Sumner, to reach the United States and the 
ears of Seward in time for Seward's answer to Lord Lyons. 
In October of 1861, Seward selected Thurlow Weed to go to London and 
correct amny of the erroneous impressions in the minds of the British, and 
also undo some of the work of the Confederate agents. He arrived in London 
at the tin:e of the Trent seizure, and upon the invitation of the London 
Times, he sent that paper a letter which was published. In this letter 
he entered a general denial of the assertion that the Federal government 
desired a rupture with England, and did what he could to change the 
29 Charles Sumner, iforks of Charles Sumner, Lee and Shepard, Boston, 1900, 
VIII, 27; also Morley, II, 392. Henceforth the first mentioned book 
will be cited as Sumner, Works. 
30 Sumner, Works, VIII, 27. 
31 ThurlowW. Barnes, Life Of Thurlow Weed, Houghton, Mifflin, New York, 
1884, II, 355. Hereafter this work will be cited as Barnes. 
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British viewpoint towards the Seward-Newcastle story.31 He referred the 
.. 
British public to Charles Francis Adams for a t rue reflex of American 
sympathies. The opinion was expressed that England had no re~l grievance 
of any sUbstantial nature against the United States.3.2 Weed said that he 
knew nothing of the proposed course of the British government, but he ex-
pressed the opinion that a peremptory demand for the release of the envoys 
. 
would be met by as per~nptory a refusal, since in temper and pride Americans 
~ere as unreasoning as the bad example of their mother country. He did not 
believe Mason and Slidell were worth a war, and hoped the matter would be 
considered calmly and with due deliberation. 33 
His communication was printed in the London Times, but his assertion 
that Seward's unfriendly utterances,\b;eginning with the "Newcastle story", 
were misunderstood, did not convince the Times, which answered him at 
length. 34 The ~ asserted its belief that upon his ability to involve 
the United states in a war with England, Seward had staked his official, 
and "most probably his political existence. 1135 
31 Thurlow VI. Barnes, Life Of Thurlow Weed, Houghton, kifflin, New York, 
1884, II, 355. Hereafter this work will be cited as Barnes. 
3.2 Ibig., 356. 
33 Ibid., 358. 
34 Ibid., 354. 
35 Ibid., 358, quoting the London Times. 
In a let!-er of December 2, 1861, Weed mentions that he saw a letter 
from a high source in London, in winch it was again said that Seward 
wanted to provoke a war with England for the purpose of getting Canada.36 
The letter continued that Seward was in a tight place and "I pray that you 
may be imbued with the vdsdom the emergency requires. 1I37 On December 4, 
1861, Seward was again warned that systematic agencies and efforts must 
. 
have been employed by the Confederacy to poison both the English govern-
ment and pwople against him,38 l'Iall around they (your friends) found 
people fortified with evid enc es of your hostility to England. ,,39 Two days 
later, Weed told Seward, that the Duke of l~ewcastle incident was being used 
to put the Idnistry agciinst him; and also that -the story had been given to 
the newspapers which added to the fuel against Seward. 40 He hoped that 
Seward foresaw the wisdom of concession to Britain, because England was 
rapidly making gigantic preparations for v'Iar. He also told Seward, flI 
was told yesterday, repeatedly, that I ought to write to the President 
den-Landing your dismissal. ,,41 This letter closed with the interesting view 
that people in .t.:ngland v~ere saying that Seward sought war with .&lgland 
36 Frederick W. Seward, Life and Letters, III, 27. 
37 Ibid. , III, 27, quoting I/eed. 
38 Ibid. , III, 28. 
39 Ibid. , III, 28, quoting;,eed. 
4fJ Ibid. , III, 29. 
41 Ibid. , III, 29, quoting ',veed. 
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because he felt that disaster loomed for the North in the Ci'Yil YJar; and 
.. 
"the suspicion that Slidell and iv"ason are in collusion with Wilkes and 
Fairfaw gains ground. n42 
Weed wrote on December 10, from London and suggested that it was 
really important that Seward devote some attention to ironing out the dif-
ficulties in relation to London and Paris. 43 He seriously warned Seward 
that unless he averted it, war was i~evitable.44 He continued: 
I pray that I am not mistaken in the hope that you 
comprehend the disastrous effect of such a Viar. I know, 
or fear that at home, another view or side to this ques-
tion exists. But be assured there is but one side to 
it. lvith England as an auxiliary to rebellion, 'We are 
crushed out •••• 45 
In the opinion of the author, 'l'hurlow Weed's views and advice to 
Seward must. have carried much weight, beeause of their long friendship 
and the obvious sincerity with which Weed wrote. 
\villiam L. Dayton, .lvi.inisterto france, wrote to Seward in an un- . 
published despatch from Paris on Jecember 3, 1861, that upon the Trent 
question the United states will have scarcely a friend among the press 
bl ' .., 46 or pu lC men ln J:!Jurope. Dayton stated that he had beenllasked by 
42 Ibid. , III, 29, quoting Weed. 
43 Ibid. , III, 29. 
44 Ibid. , III, 30. 
45 Ibid. , III, 30, quoting Weed. 
46 Di,elornatic GarresEorri ence 2 1862, 307. 
r 
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intelligent gentlemen here why it Vias that you seemed so determined to 
.. 
pick a quarrel with England. 1147 He believed it was vain to answer that 
no such determination eli d or co uld exist, becaus e und. er such circumstances 
it would have been an act of folly believed by no person.48 This very im-
portant despatch concluded with the statement that Dayton felt whether 
"right or wrong, this seizure of the Confederate commissioners on b03.rd a 
British ship has come at a most inoPi;ortune moment."49 
Thouvenel informed Dayton at this time that, in case of war, the moral 
force of French opinion would be against the United States, and that all 
the maritime powers with whom we had conferred agreed that Wilkes had vio-
lated international law. 50 
On lJecember 5, 1061, John Bigelow wrote to Seward that the errent 
sei,::ure was regarded in Paris by the press, the people, and the government, 
as a rude assault U1Jon the dignity of neutral nation. 51 He also prepared 
a letter expressing the belief that the United States would surrender the 
Confederates if Great Britain should. adopt the liberal policy favored by 
the United states gov ernme nt . Thurlow vieed had thi s letter signed by 
General ~Jinfield scott, t,hen in .i.'aris. 52 This so-called Scott letter was 
47 Ibid., 3(;7. 
42 Ibid., 307. 
4Cj Ibid., 307. 
;0 Ibid., 307. 
51 :t"rederic~c ,i. Seward, Life And_ Letters, III, 27. 
52 Ibid., III, 28. 
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published in the London Times of December 6, 1861. 53 This letter was 
... -
quoted throughout Europe and also appeared in the .New York Times of Decem-
ber 19, 1861. 54 
The next and perhaps the most important person in this group to be 
considered is Charles Francis Adams, Minister to Great Britain. Adams took 
over the London delegation on May 13, 1861. He was well fitted to his new 
. 
post by previous experience, by his power of cool judgement, and by his 
power of careful expression in critical times. 55 His very coolness, some-
times appearing as coldness and stiff dignity rendered him an especially 
fit agent to deal with Russell, a man of very similar characteristics. 56 
On November 30, Seward forwarded a despatch to Adams in which Seward 
casually mentions the capture of Mason ani Slidell and says that it is 
to be met and disposed of by tie two goverl'lIOOnts in the best possible 
sPirit. 57 He also informed Adams that Lord Lyons hadn't as yet approached 
the subject because as he was presumably awaiting instructions from Lon-
58 don. Seward also felt that the ground taken by the British government 
should be first made known to the United States, and that if there must be 
53 London Times, December 6, 1861, 7. 
54 New York Times, December 19, 1861, 1. 
55 Robert B. Mowat, Diplomatic Relations Of Great Britain ,And the United 
States, Edward ~nold, London, 1925, 171. Henceforth this work will 
be cited as Mowat. 
56 Char les F. Adams, Jr., Char Ie s ,{i'rancis Adams, 215. 
57 Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies, Government Prin-
ting Office, Washington, 1897, series 2, II, 1109. Henceforth this 
jork will be cited as Official Records. 
~., 1109. 
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a discussion,..,it should be held in Washington. He further advised Adams 
not to attach much importance to the case, and informed the Minister that 
WIlkes acted without any instructions from his government. 59 He closes 
with, III trust that the British government will consider the subject in a 
friEndly temper, and it. may expect t he best dis positi on on the part of 
this govern.nent. u60 As an added postscript Seward advises Adams that if· 
it is considered eX''pedient this confidential despatch could be read to 
61 Palma rston or Russell. 
In a despatch to Seward dated November 29, 1861, Adams refers to the 
imperati ve nature of the IITrent crisis" and says that the law officers of 
the Crown have modified their original position and now deny the right of 
the United states to "take out persons when they do not take papers and 
things. 1162 He informs Seward as to the probable British action of deman-
63 ding an apology and the release of the men. He confesses that his 
anxiety has mounted for the II fate of my unhappy country. ,,64 Adams closed 
the despatch with the statement that he flshall await with resignation the 
59 Ibid. , 1109. 
60 Ibid. , 1109. 
61 Ibid. , 1109. 
62 Dip1arllatic Cor respondenc~, 1862, 6. 
63 Ibid. , 7. 
64 Ibid. , 7. 
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instructions Yilich will probably close my mission. n65 Adams whose wisdom 
increased with the energency, strongly advised on December 3, 1861, against 
the approving Wilkes' act, unless the Unit ed states was ready to assume 
Great Britain's claim of the dominion of the seas.66 Adams believed the 
neutral rights of the United states were as valuable to us as ever, while 
tirne had reflected anything but credit on our steady defence of them against 
superior povier. 67 The Minister held that the position taken by the United 
states had always been one of resistance to dritish policy which lIendangers 
the privileges of neutrals to be free of search.,,68 Adams told Seward: 
I should be sorry to see our own country varying 
from what seems to me so honourable a record under the 
temptation of a little ephemeral success, entailing as 
it does so many of the most serious consequences to the 
prosperity of two great nations •••• 69 
Three days later he wrote again to Seward that the British ~inisters 
and people fully believed that it was the intention of the United states 
goverrunent to arive t hem into hostilities. 70 He mentioned the British 
preparations for war, such as the proclamations forbiddingt he export of 
salt-peter, gunpowder, and arms, also of the British fleet being put into 
readiness for instant action.7l In the next paragraph, Adams mentioned 
that he had done everythiDg in his pow er to combat the Briti sh idea that 
65 Ibid., 7. 
66 ~ial Records, 1115. 
67 This despatch was received by Seward on December 16. 
Official Records, 1116. 
~., 1116. 
~., 1119. 
Ibid., 1119. 
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the Administr<ltion was hostileLo Great Britain, Jut the result has been to 
give him credit for good intentions rather than lito inspire conviction of 
the Government's sincerity.,,72 Adams closes the despatch with the idea 
that by the middle of January at the latest, diplomatic relations will have 
been broken off between the two countries, "without any act of mine. ,,73 
In the despatch of December 11, 1861, Adams protests against the pre-
dicament in which he is placed by the lack of an official viewpoint from 
the United states concerning the seizure. The minister complains that 
this type of action plays into the hands of the enemy by their stating that 
the conciliatory policy of Adams is not the true policy of the United states 
74 government. 
On December 12, 1861, another despatch to Seward was written which 
conveyed the British attitude towards the lIaffair ll by mentioning the 
uneasiness of the London stock market, the feeling of different religious 
, 75 
groups, and the preparations of the government arsenals. He expected 
his mission to end in another two weeks should no special instructions 
be received in regard to future action. 76 
On December 19th Adams went by appointment to the Foreign Office 
and had a long interview with Russell. The two discussed the bearing 
72 Ibid. , 1120. 
73 ~., 1120. 
74 Ibid., 1123. 
75 ~., 1123. 
76 ~., 1124. 
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of Seward's n~te in full and reached the conclusion that an adjustment 
could be arrived at with no great difficulty.77 Adams wrote to Seward as a 
result of this interview that he "inferred that his Lordship did not desire 
war; but that he was likely to be pushed over the precipice by his desire to 
walk too close to the edge.,,78 The interview ended and Russell told Adams 
that if all matters were left to them, there could be no doubt as to a 
79 peaceful solution. 
By December 27, 1861, Adams felt that the Ministry, at least was eager 
to find away out, and that the British government would not press the Trent 
80 
to an extreme unless they were driven to it. On December 29~ 1861, Adams 
wrote Seward that he thought the signs were clear of a considerable degree of 
reaction. He also explained the causes of the nearly unanimous European 
support of England in the contention: 
Unquestionably the view of all the countries 
is that the opportunity is most fortunate for ob-
taining new and enlarged modifications of inter-
national law which will hereafter materially restraigl the provarbial tendency of the country on the ocean. 
This international tension lasted three more weeks, and during these 
weeks nothing more was heard in London from Seward concerning the "affair". 
No advice could be given from Seward because his policy was in doubt until 
the attitude of the British government could be ascertained. Then in London 
77 Charles F. Adams, Jr., Char~es Francis Adams, 228. 
78 Ibid., 221, quoting Adams. 
79 ~., 229. 
80 Charles F. Adams, Massachusetts Society, 109. 
81 ~., 110, quoting Adams. 
50 
between the n~eteenth of December, 1861 and the eighth of January, 1862, 
it was not clear what Secretary Seward had in mind when he wrote the 
despatch of November 30. 
r 
.. 
CHAPTER IV 
LORD LYONS' MEETINGS WIlli SEWARD 
Lord Russell upon hearing of a Federal warship arriving at Falmouth 
and after coaling proceeding to Southam)ton, began thinking of the Trent 
and her passengers. He was advised by his law officers that a United 
States warship would have the right to board a British mail steamer, open 
her bags examine their contents, and if the steamer should prove liable 
to confiscation for carrying dispatches from the enemy, put a prize crew 
on board and carry her to a port of the United States for adjudication. l 
In that case the law officers thought she might, and in their opinion she 
ought to disembark the passengers on the mail steamer at same convenient 
2 port. But they believed the Americans would have no right to remove 
Mason and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to 
pursue her voyage.3 A few days before the law officers gave this opinion, 
the San Jacinto intercepted the ~ and did the very thing which the law 
officers had advised she had no right to do. 
1 Charles F. Adams, Charles Francis Adams, 221. 
2 Ibid., 222. 
3 ~., 222. 
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With a PaJ'liament largely hostile to the United states, with nearly 
all of the rich and influential class unfriendly,4 with a press which ex-
hibited hatred for the North, with a large population of merchants, trades-
men, and cotton workers who were complaining of the blockade, it may readily 
be imagined what effect the news of Captain Wilkes' act created in England. 
The government was called upon to vindicate the honor of the British flag 
. 
"by exacting a full and complete reparation, or, in the event of failure, 
war mU5t be declared against the Union. ,,5 
-The London Times was the exponent of the British opinion at this time, 
so far as the government and ruling classes were heard.6 In discussing the 
matter, the Times was willing to admit that similar British precedents were 
entitled to be considered in justification of the act of Wilkes. The com-
ment was as follows: 
But it must be remembered that these decisions 
were given under circumstances very different from 
those which now occur. steamers in those days did 
not exist and mail vessels carrying letters wherein 
all of the nations of the world have immediate inter-
ests were unknown. We were fighting for existence, 
and we did in those days what we shou7d neither do nor allow others to do in these days. 
During the entire period of excitement which was caused in England by 
the seizure of the commissioners, the wrath of the British press and public 
4 Rhodes, III, 502. 
5 London Times, November 29, 1861, 6. 
6 Rhodes, III, 530. 
7 London Times, November 28, 1861, 8 
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was aimed at Secretary of state Seward. 8 His recorufitendation that the coasts 
and lake frontiers of the United states be ~ut into a condition to resist 
foreign aggression, caused all Englishmen who sympathized with the South 
to hate him. It was said and continually repeated by the London Times that 
Seward and t.he Federal government at Washington proposed to annex Canada 
to the United States, and that a pretext was wanted for a quarrel and war 
9 
with Great Britain. 
Lord Paltmerston referred the Trent llmatterlt back to the law officers 
of the Crown for a final decision. Their verdict was that Captain Wilkes 
had passed on a violation of neutrality, on the spot, instead of sending 
h t t t f d · d' t· 10 t e Tren as a prize in 0 por or a JU lca lone 
On November 29, two days after the news of the boarding of the Trent 
and seizure of the envoys had reached England, Lord Palmerston prepared a 
note to Queen Victoria in which he demanded of the American government, a 
disavowal of the act, and setting the prisoners free, and under British 
11 protection. The Queen preferred that language less harsh and offensive 
in character should be used. ,;;'ueen Victoria and Prince Albert penned the 
recorurrtended changes which were later adopted in Russell's instructions to 
Lord Lyons.12 
8 London Times, December 2, 1861, 6. 
9 Trevelyan, 318. 
10 Charles F. Adams, Charles Francis Adams, 221. 
11 Walpole, II, 346. 
12 Rhodes, III, 525. 
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Lord Lyous, of course, knew all about the Trent incident long before 
the despatch concerning it reached him from the Foreign Minister, but he 
determined "not to take any aecided step in the matter ll , until he ltreceived 
orders from His Majesty's Goverrunent 0 1113 Thus, in the absence of an 
Atlantic cable, a wholesome delay of six weeks ensured between the boarding 
of the Trent and the reception of Lord John Russell's critical despatch • 
. 
The first thing which Seward is known to have said or written about 
the affair is his confidential letter to Adams on November 30, 1861. In 
this despatch as was previously mentioned, Seward informed Adams that the 
act was done without instructions and without the knowledge of the United 
states.14 In this despatch, Seward also stated that Lord Lyons has re-
frained from communicating with him on the subject, and. It I thought it 
equally wise to reserve ourselves until we hear what the British government 
15 
may have to say.1t Seward repeated this in an official despatch of 
November 30, which was conununicated to the British government. Fran the 
day when the capture was first know, Seward and the British Minister did 
not meet, until on December 19, 1861, when Lyons came to the state Depart-
ment, and acquainted Seward in general terms with Rus sell's despatch. 
The reserve of Seward and Lyons, and their avoidance of each other 
during this month of waiting, show how strongly both felt the gravity of 
the situation, and their worry of serious consequences. 
13 State Papers, 608. 
14 Official Records, 1109. 
15 ~., 11090 
~~------------------------------~ 
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The decision formed by the British government was conveyed by Lord 
... 
16 
Russell to Lord ~ons on November 30th. The note mentioned that friendly 
relations have long existed between Great Britain and the United states, 
and t hat he, (Lord Russell), was unwilling to believe that Wilkes was acting 
on orders from his government.17 Lyons was also instructed that the United 
states should liberate the four men, and that they be placed under British 
protection, with an apology due to th~ British government.18 If these 
terms were not offered to Lord Lyons, then he was to propose them to Seward. 
In a second dispatch on the same day Russell requested Lyons to inform 
Seward that the answer of the United States was not to exceed seven days, 
and that if there was no answer by that time the British legation in 
19 
Washington was to return to London. 
In a private letter Russell advised Lyons that at the first meeting 
with Seward he was not to take his letter of instructions, but to prepare 
him for it. At the second meeting he was to read the full despatch. Ac-
cording to Montague Bernard, Russell added: 
If he asks what will be the consequence of 
his refusing compliance, I think you should say 
that you wish to leave him and the President 
quite free to take their own course, and that 20 
you desire to abstain from anything like menance. 
16 state Papers, 605. 
17 ~., 605. 
18 ~., 605. 
19 ~., 606. 
20 Montague Bernard, Historical Account of Neutrality of Great Britain Durin 
the American Civil War.~ Longmans, ,Green, London, 1870, 194. Henceforth 
W' IR .B( _as 'Rel"nJ:ll"n 
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The last diplomatic note reveals the motives and policy of the British 
... 
government in the whole porceeding. It was on the part of Great Britain a 
21 
case of uncalled for braggadocio and bullying. 
On December 7, 1861, Russell wrote another private letter to Lyons. 
Russell mentions that he has been thinking of Seward's possible evasive 
answers which might fall short of Britaints demands. 22 Russell wanted a 
. 
simple yes or no for an answer which had to be made within seven days of 
presentation. The letter closed with a post-script that he would be 
satisfied if Mason and Slidell were placed under the protection of the 
British flag, but Lyons was to leave Washington if this was not obtained. 23 
These despatches and letters, if they had been sent alone would have been 
grave. The gravity of the situation was emphasized by the hurried despatch 
of the British Guards and other troops to Canada, and by the fact that 
instructions were sent to Sir Arthur Milne, who commanded the British fleet 
in American waters.24 Meanwhile a notable change had taken pla~e in Amer-
ican public opinion. It now regarded "the Wilkes affair unfavorably and 
would much prefer it had not occurred at all,1I 25 a reaction without question 
21 Charles F. Adams, "The Trent Affair", American Historical Review, 
Macmillan Company, London, 1912, XVII, 556. Henceforth this work 
will be cited as Charles F. Adams, American Historical Review. 
22 Newton I, 64. 
23 ~., 64. 
24 state Papers, 606. 
25 Charles F. Adams, Massachusetts Society, 107. 
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almost wholly:" caused by the knowledge of t he British demand and the unani-
mous support giverr it by the British PUblic. 26 
On December 18, 1861, at 11:30 P.M., a messenger delivered Russell's 
despatch to Lyons, and also two private letters in which full instructions 
were given.27 Thus, on December 19, Lyons acquainted Seward with the 
general nature of Russell's leading despatch • 
. 
Lyons stated, according to Russell's words, that the only redress which 
could satisfy the British government would be the immediate release of the 
prisoners to him, that they might be placed under British protection, and 
also a suitable apology for the action cOmmitted. 28 He added that Britain 
hoped the United States would offer this reparation of its o~ accord, and 
because of his hope for this arrangement, he had come without any written 
demand. 29 If this was possible he was willing to be guided by Seward, as 
to the conduct "which would render its attainment most easy. ,,30 Seward 
asked Lyons, if any time was fixed within which the United states govern-
ment must reply. Lyons answered that he did not like to answer the question 
because he desired to abstain from anything which suggested menance.3l 
After more of Seward's probing questions' Lyons finally stated that he must 
have Seward's answer within seven days.32 
26 Ibid." 110. 
27 State PaEers, 623. 
28 ~." 623. 
29 Ibid." 623. 
30 Ibid., 623. 
31 Ibid., 623. 
2 Newton I 6 • 
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Seward r:quested a copy of the despatch unofficially and informally 
as so much "depended on the wording of it that it was impossible to come 
to a decision without reading it. ,,33 Seward said that if he was given a 
copy of the message, it would be given on the understanding that no one but 
the President and himself should know that it,had been delivered0 34 Lyons 
agreed to the suggestion and after returning to the Embassy, sent Seward 
a copy of the despatch. 
In the opinion of Lyons, Seward received the communication "seriously, 
and with dignity, but without any manifestation of dissatisfaction.,,35 
Seward closed the interview with the assurance that he was aware of th~ 
"frienUyand conciliatory manner in which I had made it.,,36 
Lyons purposely avoided menance in the interview because he feared 
that men~ce could be an obstacle to the United states yielding, and at 
the same time let Seward know how earnest Great Britain felt towards the 
matter)7 The !iiinister did not believe the United states would give in, 
but at the same time he did not regard it as impossible, especially if the 
next news from England would bring tidings of warlike preparations)8 
33 Ibid., I, 66, quoting Lyons. 
34 Ibid., I, 66. 
35 State Papers, 623. 
36 Ibid., 623, quoting Lord Lyons. 
37 Newton, I, 660 
38 Ibid., I, 660 
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After Seward received the despatch he again visited Lyons and expressed 
... 
himself pleased to find the "despatch was courteous and friendly and not 
dictatorial of menacing. 1I39 Seward asked Lyons what would happen if after 
the seven days Seward s,ent a refusal or a proposal to discuss the question. 40 
~ons answered that if the answer was not satisfactory, he could not accept 
't 41 l. • 
. 
On December 21, 1861, ~ons again visited Seward. Seward stated that 
other pressing duties had prevented him from fully mastering this question, 
and he requested that the fonnal presentation of the case might be post-
42 
poned until the follow~ng Monday. ~ons agreed to this request on the 
condition that the meeting would be held early Monday morning so Lyons could 
43 
mail his despatches on the next available ship. 
At the appointed hour on December 23, Lyons called again, read the 
despatch and left Seward a copy of it.44 Seward said that the President 
would be immediately informed of the contents of the despatch and that 
Lyons "should without delay receive a communication with regard to it.,,45 
39 State Papers, 623, quoting Lord Lyons. 
40 Newton I, 66. 
41 Ibid., I, 66. 
42 State PaEers, 625. 
43 ~., 625. 
44 Ibid., 626. 
45 Ibid., 625. 
41 
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From December .2.3 the seven days, in which an answer to Lord Lyons had to be 
... 
made, began. 
Lyons' faimess can be judged by his allowing Seward plenty of time, 
in not presenting the British despatch officially until the Last possible 
moment, that is, until the eve of the ~ep9.rture of t he next weekly mail 
ship. His aim throughout the negotiation was to bring it about that the 
• . 1 United States compliance "should have as much as possible, the air of havmg 
been made spontaneously. II 46 
In the despatch of December .2.3rd which Lyons sent to Russell infonning 
him of the latest details of his meeting with Seward, Lyons mentioned that 
he believed the United states was frightened. still he felt that nothing 
but the beginning of hostilities would convince most of the people of the 
United states that Britain would fight. 47 Lyons also informed Russell that 
Seward was now on the side of peace. He presumes that "ten months of office 
have dispelled many of his illusions. n48 Still he cannot earnestly say how 
Seward will react to the British demands because "if the President and the 
Cabinet throw the whole burden on his shoulders, he may refuse to bear it .1149 
46 ~o, 6.25. 
47 Newton, I, 68. 
48 ~., I, 69. 
49 Ibid., I, 70. 
61 
Lord Lyons carried out the spirit as well as the letter'of his 
.. 
instructions. During this period his attitude of reserve was irreproachable. 
He wrote to Russell that he "avoided the subject of the capture on board 
the Trent as much as possible, and have said no more than that it is an 
untoward event which I very much regret. 1I50 
At this time there was nothing for Lord Lyons to do, but to wait 
for Secretary Seward's reply. 
50 Official Records, 1097. 
... 
CHAPTER V 
THE CABINET MEETING 
All of the members of President Lincoln t s Cabinet, with the exception 
of Montgomery Blair, held a different attitude after the Cabinet meetings 
of December 25th and 26th than they did when the news of the seizure was 
announced. 
According to Gideon Welles, in the beginning Seward was most elated 
and jubilant over the cpature of liitason and Slidell, and "for a time made 
no attempt to conceal his gratification and approval of the act of 
Wilkes. lIl Frederic Bancroft, a biographer of Seward, believed this to be 
highly probable because IIwere it otherwise, Seward would have been a rare 
exception. ,,2 Yet it mus t be remembered that as far as the public knew, 
Seward was non-committal on the affair. 
Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, was much pleased, and sent a 
letter congratulating Wilkes on his safe arrival and especially on the 
great public service he had rendered.3 
1 Welles, 185. 
2 Bancroft, II, 2320 
3 Official Records, 1109. 
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Bensou J. Lossing who says that he happened to be in the War Department 
when the news reached Simon Cameron, participated in three cheers for Wilkes, 
led by the Secretary of War.4 
Salmon Chase felt that the seizure was warranted, and also that Wilkes 
had done his duty by seizing Mason and Slidell. 
Attorney-General Bates, in his diary, believed the seizure not only 
to be legal, but also that Wilkes would have been justified in confiscating 
the shiP.5 He also believed that Great Britain would not take offense at 
the seizure.6 
The only manber of the Cabinet who believed that Wilkes had committed 
a blunder was Montgomery Blair. 
To analyze the reasons for the above reaction it must be remembered 
that no event of the war up to that time caused 6.0 much rejoicing in all 
of the loya~ states.7 In the opinion of the North, these men were bent 
on a traitorous errand which might lead to the permanent dissolution of 
the Union. Further.more, after the early Confederate victories this was one 
of the first opportunities for the North to celebrate what they regarded 
4 Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial History of Civil War, T. Belknap, Hartford, 
1868, II, 156. Hereafter this work will be cited as Lossing. 
5 Edward Bates, "Diary of Edward Bates ll , American Historical Association, 
edited by Howard K. Beale, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1933, 
IV, 202. Hereafter this work will be cited as Bates. 
6 Ibid., 202. 
7 Bancroft, II, 226. 
as a victor3_ In addition, the attitude of Great Britain towards the 
seizure did not reach the United states for another two weeks. 
A dispute has arisen over the reaction of Abraham Lincoln when he 
first was informed of the seizure. Lossing writes that Lincoln took a 
very sober view of the seizure and told him in conversation that he re-
garded it a violation of the principles for which we fought England in 1812. 
According to Lossing, Lincoln held the traitors to be flwhite elephants" and 
that if Great Britain would protest the seizure, the United states would 
have to surrender them and apologize_ Otherwise we would be admitting that 
England has been right nfor at least sixty years.,,9 Welles, Nicolay" and 
Hay seemingly hold the same attitude; yet there are certain indications 
that Lincoln did not want to retreat before the British threats. These 
indications seem to lead to a settlement of the dispute by arbitration or 
negotiation. They are exhibited by Lincoln's draft of a letter proposing 
arbitration and by his conversation with Seward after the Cabinet meetings 
of December 25th and 26th. Both of these incident s will be further de-
veloped in this chapter. 
In the opinion of Thornton K. Lothrop, a biographer of Seward, the 
Lossing conversation with Lincoln is false. Lothrop holds that the stor,y 
was first published seven years after the conversation took place" and has 
8 Lossing, I, 156. 
9 ~." 157" quoting Lincoln. 
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10 
never been confirmed. Lothrop also holds that, according to Welles' 
statements, Lincoln was impressed with the gravity of the situation and 
thought the capture embarassing only because he did not know what could 
.be, done with the prisoners and was afraid what the punishment would be 
demanded for them. Thus, Lothrop states that the two opinions are quite 
I 
11 
different; yet not absolutely i~consistent with each other. 
Seward's decision made, he had to convince the President. Lincoln 
told Seward to go on preparing his answer as to why Mason and Slidell 
should be surrendered while he would try to state the reasons .why they 
12 
should not be given up. Lincoln believed that both sets of reasons should 
then be compared. 
At this point, I would like to present a digest of Lincoln's despatch 
which he wrote at this time. In this note the President wrote that, if 
there existed no fact or facts pertinent to the case beyond those stated 
by the British government, the reparation sought by Great Britain from 
the United States would be justly due and promptly made.13 Lincoln stated 
that he was reluctant to volunteer his view of the case with no assurance 
that the British government would consent to hear him. Yet he was directed 
to say, that the government intended no affront to the British flag or to 
the British nation, and this act was done without the authorization of the 
government.14 
10 Lothrop, 307. 
11 ~., 308. 
12 Bancroft, II, 234. 
13 Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln's Works, VII, 63. 
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An inquiry was made as to whether the British government would consider the 
... 
American side of the question, including the fact of existing insurrection 
in the United states; the neutral attitude of England toward the belligerents 
their American citizenship and the traitorous mission of the captured persons 
the British captain's knowledge of these things when the ccmnissioners em-
barked at Havana; the place where the capture was made, and the bearing of 
international law and precedent upon the case.15 It was then stated that, 
if the foregoing together with any others pertinent to either side of the 
case could be submitted, the Federal government would, if England were 
willing, cheerfully submit the whole affair to the peaceful arbitration 
16 
and would abide by the result. The last paragraph of the proposed des-
patch provided that no redress should exceed in kind and amount that which 
was already demanded and that the award should constitute the basis of a 
rule for the determination of similar cases between the two nations in the 
17 
future. In the proposed despatch Lincoln's crafty phraseology is quite 
evident in relation to pinning down and holding Great Britain in check, 
now and in the future, in maritime disputes such as the Trent affair. 
This draft did not suit Lincoln, and was never presented to the Cabinet, 
but its importance to this subject exists from the fact that, undoubtedly 
Seward and Lincoln had been considering the above-named proposals as one of 
the ways of extricating the United States from the position in which it had 
15 Ibid., 64. 
16 Ibid., 64. 
17 Ibid., 65. 
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been placed.. After the Cabinet meeting on December 26th, Lincoln told 
Seward that he could not find an argument that would satisfy his own mind, 
"and that proved to me your ground was the right one. 1I1B 
The Cabinet meeting was set for Tuesday morning, December 24th, but 
Seward postponed it until Christmas day because he was not yet ready. On 
the morning of December 25th, IB61 no one except Blair and Seward seems to 
have favored a full compliance with the British demand. Seward later wrote 
to Weed and said that when the subject was taken up by the Cabinet, the other 
did not wish tq concede the case to Great Britain, still they "had no idea 
of the grounds upon which it would explain its action.,,19 Yet they were 
unanimous towards the release of Mason and Slidell, after two days exami-
t . 20 na l.on. This meeting lasted until two o'clock in the afternoon. The 
President's experimental draft previously mentioned was not read; there is 
no mention of either the reading or the points it raised. More than half 
of the days of grace had elapsed and something haa to be done quickly, else 
a foreign war would be added to the domestic war. However desirable 
arbitration may have been, it was prevented by the nature of the demand of 
England. One day was not found sufficient for the consideration of this 
important matter, and the session was therefore continued on the following 
18 frederiCk W. Seward, Life and Letters, III, 26, quoting Lincoln. 
19 Weed, II, 409, quoting Seward. 
~., 409. 
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day. Seward's proposed despatch upon which the surrender was based could 
... 
not be fully discussed at one session, so the paper appears to have been 
prepared solely by the Secretary of State without the assistance of either 
21 
Lincoln or any of his Cabinet officers. Of the debate and various opinions, 
we have some record in the subsequent writings of the different persons who 
were present. 
Salmon Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, believed Wilkes violated 
those principles of the law of nations which the United States, so closely 
guarded. Chase said that Wilkes did this by taking the parties concerned 
22 from the Trent without invoking any judicial tribunal. Thus Great Britain 
had a right to ask us for a disavowal of the act and the return of Mason and 
Slidell. Chase thought the seizure to be a mere technical violation of 
England's neutral rights considering the circumstances under which the act 
was carried out. There was no aggressive behavior or unfriendly intent 
23 
towards England. Chase reviewed the hostile intentions of Mason and 
Slidell, and the fact of their status being known to the captain of the 
, 
,I 
, 
I 
Trent. Here th9 Trent viola.ted English law, and was not treating the United 
4 /111 states as a friendly nation.2 After the English captain refused to exhibit 
to Lieutenant Fairfax his passenger list, Chase felt that Wilkes had the 
right to break up the voyage, nand send the steamer as prize into a port 
21 Lathrop, 306. 
22 Robert B. Warden, Life of Salmon P. Chase, Wilstach, Baldwin and Company, 
New York, 1874, 393. Hereafter this work will be cited as Warden. 
23 ~., 393. 
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for trial or .. condemnation. rr25 Wilkes desiring not to inflict a delay on 
the other passengers deprived himself of the only means of justifying his 
26 
capture flthrough judicial decision. II Thus he believed that the technical 
right was vdth England because they could not lawfully be removed from the 
ship until a judicial decision had been made. Chase then stated how we 
could not afford delays because our commerce might be endangered, the 
. 
carrying out of the war hindered, and the attitude of other nations towards 
the United states violation of the rights of neutrals should be considered.27 
The Secretary concluded by saying: 
It is gall and wormwood to me. Rather than 
consent to the liberation of these men, I would 
sacrifice everything I possess. But I am con-
soled by the reflection that, while nothing but 
severest retribution is due them, the surrender ••• 
is ••• simply proving faithful to our own ideas and 
traditions under strong temptation to violate them; 
simply giving ••• to the world the most signal proof 
that the American nation will not ••• for the sake of 
inflicting just punishment for rebe~~, commit even 
a technical wrong against neutrals. 
Gideon Welles held that Seward was at the beginning opposed to any idea 
of concession which involved giving up the emissaries, but yielded imme-
29 
diately with dexterity to the peremptory demand of Great Britain. He 
stated that Seward should receive credit for his skillful handling and prep-
30 
aration of the despatch. According to Welles, this exhibited Seward's 
25 Ibid., 393, quoting Chase. 
26 ~., 393, quoting Chase. 
27 ~., 394. 
28 quoting Chase. 
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readiness, ~act, and talent to remove himself from and to pass on certain 
31 difficulties. 
Regarding his personal views towards the case, Welles glosses over the 
32 
congratulatory telegram he sent Wilkes. Welles says that even before 
the administration had decided upon any action, he thought that Wilkes might 
be excused for patriotic reasons, but by no means should his action set a 
precedent for future action.33 
Montgomery Blair, the Post~aster General, seems form the first to 
have held more radical views concerning the matter than did the President 
or anyone else. He did not publicly discuss the case, but to the other 
members of the Cabinet he denounced Captain Wilkes' act as an outrage on 
the British flag, which he said" the English Minister would seize upon to 
make war upon the United States.34 Not being an admirer of Wilkes, Blair 
said that he should be ordered to take Iroquois, with Mason am Slidell on 
board,· proceed to England and deliver them over to the British government.35 
This he thought would be a manifestation of the greatest contempt and 
indifference for the Confederate emissaries, and a severe rebuke to what-
ever of alleged intrigues that may have existed between the insurgents in 
the United States and the English Cabinet. 
31 Ibid." 185. 
32· ~., 187. 
33 Ibid., 188. 
34 William E. Smith, Blair Family in Politics, Macmillan Company, New York" 
1933, II, 194. Hereafter this work will be cited as Smith. 
35 Ibid." 194. 
From. th~ published. extracts taken from the diary of Attorney-General 
Bates, it appears that there was a full and frank discussion of Seward's 
note. All the members of the Cabinet were impressed with the extraordinary 
gravity of the situation as probably the fate of the nation depended on 
the result of their deliberations.36 Bates, himself, urged the surrender, 
Waiving the legal right about which there was much doubt, he favored 
compliance with the British demand on account of the necessity of the case.37 
He told of the dangers of going to war with England and the repercussions 
of such an action. A few of the se dangers would be the breaking of the 
blockade, the ruin of United states trade, bankruptcy of the treasury, and 
other calamities.38 According to Bates, President Lincoln and the other 
39 
manbers were too slow to acknowledge these truths. 
Charles Sumner, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations COmmittee, 
had no small part to play towards the settlement of the "~affair't. He 
was in Boston when the news of the seizure arrived and at once said, 'fWie 
shall have to give them uP.1I40 In his letters to Cobden and Bright, Sumner 
36 Bates, 216. 
37 ~., 216. 
38 Ibid., 216. 
39 Ibid., 216. 
40 Moorfield Storey, Charles F. Sumner, Houghton, Mifflin, New York, 1900, 
209. Hereafter this work will be cited as Storey. 
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did his beet to arouse the moral sentiment of England in our favor, and to 
warn against the calamities for which Great Britain would be held responsible 
if there was intervention or any other unfriendly action on her part.41 
He was deeply moved by the attitude of English public opinion, and the hos-
42 
tile attitudes of EnglandTs leaders. 
In the opinion of Charles Fr~cis Adams, during these trying times the 
bearing of Sumner was above criticism; 43 and when the time came he used his 
influence in such a way that added glory and credit to the United States 
44 
during these trying days. 
The peremptory tone of the English demand and the strong feeling in the 
United states made Sumner's course difficult. Sumner persistently urged 
his views on Lincoln; and as soon as the Bright-Cobden correspondence was 
received, he read or sent them to Lincoln.45 He attended the Cabinet 
meeting on December 25, 1861, and read to Lincoln and the Cabinet leaders, 
private letters fram Bright and Cobden. These letters, as has been men-
tioned, earnestly urged a yielding for America and depicting the strength 
of British feeling.46 If Sumner's opinion was asked, he doubtless expressed 
41 Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Roberts Brothers, 
Boston, 1893, IV, 147. Hereafter this v,ork will be cit ed as Pierce. 
42 illQ;., 147. 
43 Charles F. Adams, Massachusetts Society, 63. 
45 Sumner,~, VIII, 24. 
46 Ibid., 270 
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himself warmly in favor of Seward's decision. 
During the course of the Cabinet meeting of December 25th, a despatch 
arrived from Thouvenel to the French Minister at Washington, Mercier. This 
despatch which had been written in Paris on December 3, 1861 was received 
by Mercier that morning, and impressed by its importance, hurried to the 
47 White House and begged that it be submitted at once to Seward. This 
despatch fully confirmed the reports about France's attitude. It mention~ 
48 
that France was glad to find Great Britain reversing her practice; but 
what must have stirred the men present at the meeting was the sincere 
appeal made to the United States not to commit the fatal mistake of trying 
49 
to defend what had been done. Thouvene1 believed that the only thing the 
Uni ted states could do, would be to-yield to the British demands, return 
the commissioners, and offer such explanations as would satisfy Great 
50 
Britain. The despatch closed by saying that Thouvene1 wished because of 
51 
friendship, to make his interpretation known. 
As the title of this paper suggests, it is outside the scope of the 
subject to treat the detailed attitude of European countries towards the 
settlement of the Trent affair. The reason for this statement is that by 
the time the European foreign ministers presented their views towards the 
47 John B. McMaster, History of the United states During Lincoln's 
Administration, Appleton, New York, 1927, 151. Hereafter this 
work will be cited as McMaster. 
48 Official Records, 1116. 
49 ~., 1117. 
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affair, ~ward had already prepared his answer to Great Britain. Neverthe-
less, Seward did receive warnings concerning the European attitude, as has 
already been mentioned in Chapter III. 
After a studied examination of the Cabinet leaders, the main reason 
for hesitation was doubtless the fear of public opinion in the North. It 
was certain that a surrender of ~he commissioners would bring the dis-
pleasure of the people upon the government, which would be accused of having 
52 
timidly submitted to the unjust demands of England. The Cabinet discussion 
ended on December 26, 1861 in a unanimous agreement upon the letter of reply 
which Seward had prepared. 
52 Bates, 216. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SEVVARD'S NOTE 
In preparing the note Seward undoubtedly had many things to consider. 
The United States government was to be allowed no opportuhity far a full 
statement of the facts or to present its own views of the right to make the 
capture. Behind the demand was the instruction to Lord Lyons to leave 
Washington within a week if the United States failed to comply with the 
1 
British ter.ms; there was the hurrying of several thousand troops to Canada 
and the hasty fortification of the frontier of those provinces; and lastly 
the evasive answer Lord Lyons should return, if he were asked what would be 
2 
the consequences of a refusal to surrender the prisoners. These things 
all foretold what the consequence would be, if any attempt were made by the 
Unit~d States to maintain the seizure on the principles of international 
law as determined by British precedents and practice. It meant simply 
instant war. This would be a struggle in which England would be actuated 
by motives of selfish policy in a much greater degree than by the principle 
that she was pretending to uphold and defend. The weavers of Lancashire, 
1 Newton, I, 65. 
2 ~., I, 66. 
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at that time", were beginning to suffer from a cotton famine, and there was 
such impatience from that quarter on account of the continuance of the Civil 
3 War. To the United states, on the other hand, such a war meant the loss of 
everything.4 This vlould include the transfer of the Federal armies to the 
northern frontier,5 the raising of the blockade, the ravaging of unprotecte 
coasts, the bombardment and blockade of seacoast cities, a probable inva-
. 6 
sion of the northern states by British troops from Canada, and an alliance 
between England and the Confederacy which would probably result in estab-
lishing the independence of the latter.7 It was necessary to bear all these 
things in mind while considering the British demand. It may be assumed 
with confidence that the perils of a conflict with Great Britain, as was 
emphasized by the advice of Bright, Cobden, Adams, Weed, Bigelow, and Dayton 
was the chief factor in Seward1 s conclusions. 
Seward evidently did not expect Great Britain to take such a serious 
stand in regard to the matter. It had been his belief that the British 
8 
government would not want the prisoners. He said on a later occasion 
that Lord Lyons1 communication was his first knowledge that the British 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Donn Piatt, Memories 
New York, 1887, 165. 
Bates, 214. 
Ibid. , 215. 
Ibidl, 215. 
lliS!. , 215. 
Welles, 186. 
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governm~ proposed to make it a ~uestion of insult and of war.9 
The President and Cabinet having agreed to surrender the Confederate 
commissioners, Secretary Seward's reply to the British demand was sent to 
Lord Lyons. The communication was quite long and began by making a careful 
10 
statement of the contents of Russe11 t s note of November 30, 1861. Seward 
then stated that the capture was, made without any direction, instruction, 
or even foreknowledge of the Federal government. It also mentioned that no 
orders had been issued to Captain Wilkes or any naval officer to arrest 
the four persons taken from the Trent, or any other British ship. Thus, 
the British government would infer from these facts that the United states 
had no purpose or even thought of forcing into discussion the question that 
had arisen. 
The facts concerning the boarding of the ~ as reported by Commander 
Williams of the British Navy were then reviewed by Seward and the supposed 
11 
fictions pointed out. 
Seward reminded Russell that in his correspondence he had omitted the 
facts that at the time of the seizure, an insurrection was existing in the 
United States which this government was engaged in suppressing by the 
emplyment of land and naval forces, and that in regard to this domestic 
strife the United States considered Great Britain as a friendly power, while 
9 Weed, II, 415. 
10 Official Records, 1145. 
11. Ibid., 1146. 
12 
she had assumed for herself the attitude of a neutral • 
... 
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Next, it was mentioned that Great Britain and the United States rec-
ognized the two articles of the Declaration of Paris in 1856, that the 
neutral or friendly flag should cover an enemy's goods not contraband of 
war, and that neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to 
capture under any enemy's flag. "These exceptions of contraband from 
favour were a negative acceptance by the parties of the rule ••• everywhere 
recognized as a part of the law of nations that whatever is contraband ' 
is liable to capture and confiscation in all cases.,,13 
The character and purposes of the persons seized were then carefully 
explained, and the statement ma,de that it was to be presumed that the 
commissioners bore dispatches which it appeared from information sent by 
the American Minister at Paris had escaped the search of the Trent, and 
reached England in safety.14 Seward also stated that the agent and officers 
of the Trent, including Commander Williams, before leaving Havana knew that 
Mason and Slidell were commissioners from the Confederate States on their 
15 
way to Europe. From the above facts Secretary Seward arrived at the 
16 
conclusion that the case was not an act of violence or outrage, but only 
12 ~., 1147. 
13 ~., 1147. 
14 !£M., 1147. 
15 ~., 1147. 
16 ~., 1148. 
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an ordinary.and legal belligerent proceeding against a neutral vessel 
carrying contraband of war for the use and benefit of the insurgents; that 
the question was whether this had been done in accordance with the law of 
nations; and that the following inquiries were involved: 
1) Were the persons named and their supposed 
despatches contraband of war? 
2) Might Captain Wilkes lawfully stop and 
search the Trent for these contraband persons 
and despatches? 
3) Did he exercise that right in a lawful 
and proper meaning? 
4) Having found the contraband persons on 
board and in presumed possession of the contra-
band despatches, had he a right to capture the 
persons? 
5) Did he exercise that right of capture 
in the manner allowed and recognized by the 
law of nations?17 
It was then stated that if these questions should be answered in the 
affirmative, the British government would ha.ve no claim for reparation. 
An affirmative conclusion was reached in the case of the first four 
18 
questions. Seward remarked ttat "maritime law is clear as to the dis-
position to be made of captured contraband vessels and property, but it 
says nothing c one erning the mode of procedure in regard to contraband 
persons.,,19 Regret was expressed that maritime systems of law furnished 
no better processes of determining the characters of contraband persons. 
17 ~., 1148. 
18 ~., 1149. 
19 Ibid., 1149. 
So 
Seward thought all unprejudiced minds would agree that, it would be 
better to follow the existing judicial remedy than to adopt the idea of 
leaving the decision with the captor and relying upon diplomatic debates 
to review his decision. It was practically Ita choice between law, with 
its imperfections and delays, and war with its evils and desolations. 1I20 
The Secretary next reviewed the course of Wilkes in making a prize 
. 
of the Trent and capturing the contraband persons lawfully, then permitting 
her to continue upon her voyage, instead of sending her into port for ad-
21 jUdication. The capture was incomplete, if the whole thing constituted 
a single transaction. It was unfinished or abandoned. Whether the leaving 
of the act unfinished was voluntary or not, was the question which was to 
determine the validity of the British claim for reparation.22 If necessary, 
and therefore involuntary, the British claim for reparation would be un-
founded; ,if unnecessary and involuntary then the claim was well founded. 
At this point Seward reviewed Wilkes' reasons for not carrying the 
Trent into port. The first reason wa.s on account of his being so reduced 
in officers and crew,23 and the second was the inconvenience, loss, and 
disappointment which would have resulted to the passengers of the vessel. 
The United States could not disavow such humane motives, but it did not 
occur to Wilkes that such a course might sacrifice the right of the govern-
ment to retain the captured persons, although he was not deserving of 
20 ~., 1151. 
21 ~., 1151. 
22 ~., 1152. 
, 
l 
81 
censure for al't',Ything that he had done. The question was not whether he was 
justified to his gove~ent, but what.the view of his government was as to 
24 
the effect of his course in not bringing the ~ into port. It would 
have been entirely involuntary if made solely upon the ground that Wilkes 
could not bring the prize vessel into port on account of a lack of officers 
and crew necessary to do so. Neithe~ is a large prize crew necessary for 
it is the duty of the captured party to assent and go willingly before the 
judicial tribunal which tries the case.25 Should the captured party express 
a determination to use force which there is no reasonable probability of 
the captor's overcoming without too much risk to himself, he may properly 
,leave the prize vessel to proceed on her voyage and it cannot afterward be 
objected that she has been deprived of the judicial remedy which was her 
due. Because Wilkes' second reason was different from the first, Seward 
came to the conclusion that the release of the Trent was not made of necessi 
26 
and was therefore voluntary. 
Seward disclaimed that any deliberate wrong in the transaction had 
~ 27 been meditated or approved. He remarked that what had happened was simply 
an inadvertency from a rule uncertainly established. He believed that for 
this error, Great Britain had a right to expect the same reparation that we 
24 ~., 1153. 
25 Ibid., 1153. 
26 I£!£., 1153. 
27 ~., 1153. 
would expect in a similar case. Seward very capably stated that he was 
• 
not aware that in examining this question he seems to be taking the British 
side against his own country, but again he discovered that was really de-
fending an old honored, and cherished American cause. He mentioned that 
these principles had been "laid down for us in 1804 by James Madison, when 
Secretary of State ••• in instructions given to James Monroe, our Minister 
28 
to England. 1I 
A quotation was then inserted from one of Madison's despatches, in 
which he said that a belligerent commander is not permitted to condemn 
and seize on the deck of a neutral vessel, property suspected of being 
contraband, but -that the whole matter must be submitted to a prize court 
which can assess damages against the captor for an abuse of his power; 
hence it is unreas'onable, unjust and inhuman to permit a naval officer 
restricted in the case of mere property of trivial amount to decide, on 
the deck of his vessel without any sort of trial, the question of allegiance 
and carry such decision into effect by forcing every individual he may 
choose into a service of detestable and humiliating to the impressed seaman 
and dangerous again to life itself. 29 
Seward expressed satisfaction at being able to decide the case upon 
strictly American principles, and the statement made that the claim of the 
28 Ibid., 1153. 
29 Ibid., 1154. 
British g~ernment had not been made in a discourteous manner. 30 
He believed that it was the duty of the American government to disavow 
Wilkes' act and return the prisoners. Seward very capably stated for the 
benefit of Great Britain: 
If the safety of this Union required the 
detention of the captured persons, it would be 
the right and duty of tRis government to de-
tain them. But the effectual check and waning 
proportions of the existing insurrection, as 
well as the C0ID.9ari ti ve unimportance of the 
captured persons themselves, when dispassion-
ately weighed, happily forbid me from resorting 
to this defense ••• 31 
Seward again called attention to the fact that Great Britain had often 
refused to yield claims like the one under consideration, and it was 
thought a matter of special congratulation that the British government had 
disavowed its former principles and was now contending for what the United 
.32 States had always insisted upon. The Secretary closed this very important 
note by saying that the seized persons being held in custody would be cheer-
fully liberated. "lour lordship will please indicate a time and place for 
receiving them. 1/33 
This was the reply of William H. Se.ward which was also the reply of the 
United States government conceding to the British demand. The entire 
30 Ibid., 1154. 
31 Ibid., 1154. 
32 ~., 1154 • 
.33 Ibid., 1154. 
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comm.unicati~ conveys the idea to the reader that it was prepared for the 
purpose of finding diplomatic reasons for the surrender of the Confederate 
Commissioners.34 In considering the worthiness of such a note, it must be 
remembered that Seward's answer was prepared at a time of national crisis 
and also on brief notice. It was necessary for Seward to persuade a Presi-
dent who wished to dispose of the affair in a different manner. The 
reluctant members,of a divided Cabinet were to be conciliated and unified. 
Captain Wilkes who had become a naval idol had to be justified and supported. 
Congress also had to be pacified because of its actions after the disclosure 
35 
of the capture. Seward was indeed placed in a delicate and complicated 
position. At the same time that he yielded to Britain's demand, he justi-
fied the spirit of Wilkes' act and was able to place the surrender solely 
upon a simple mistake, an error made out of humane considerations and 
consequently one which was not deserving of censure. By showing that in 
making the surreooer" he was guided by long cherished American principles" 
he held back the censure and objections which were certain to come from 
the United States. 
This paper was highly characteristic of Seward because as his biogra-
phers suggest" he was at last given the opportunity to save his nation at 
a time of national crisis. His answer was written in that careless and 
34 The full contents of this despatch may also be found in William H. Seward 
Works" V, 295 to 309. 
35 Bancroft" II" 239. 
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confident att.;itude that so characterized his correspondence. He smoothed 
over the places which were most antagonistic to Great Britain and elaborated 
upon the points where he was on safe ground. The note was intermittently 
dotted with crafty implications or plausible assumptions. 
Seward made a few comments on his reply to Lord Lyons. In a letter of 
December 27, 1861 to Adams, Seward maintained that the United states as 
always have vindicated their consistency, prinCiples, and poliCY, while 
"measuring out to Great Britain, the justice which they have always claimed 
at her hands. n36 On December 27th, he also wrote a letter to Thurlow Weed 
mentioning that when lVeed would read the reply he would know who wrote it. 
He also mentioned that Weed would have to shield him from reproaches as he 
had so ably done in England.37 Seward told Weed that it was necessary to 
consult the tempers of people in the United states as well as in England, 
and that if he had been as tame as Weed suggested, "I should have had no 
standing of my own. 1I38 A few years later, Seward while on a visit to 
General Grant's headquarters gav~ his reasons for the release of Mason and 
Slidell. He said that the books on international law gave no clue as how 
39 
the subject should be handled. It was decided to release the prisoners 
rather than become embroiled in a war with Great Britain and possibly France. 
36 Official Records, 1143. 
37 FrederiCk W. Seward, Life and Le:bters, III, 34. 
38 ~., III, 46. 
39 Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant, Century Company, New York, 1897, 
253. Hereafter this vvork will be cited as Porter. 
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He knew that.it was the desire of the Confederacy to have the United states 
become embroiled in a foreign war, and thus he decided to prevent assistance 
from abroad.40 
Lincoln while conferrins with Grant in 1864 said that during the trying 
days before the settlement, Seward studied the various works on international 
law, and "came to Cabinet meetings loaded to the muzzle with the subject.,,41 
On December 27, 1861, Lord ~ons acknowledged receipt of Seward's note 
to Commander Hewett of the English boat, Rinaldo, directing him to proceed 
at once with his vessel to Provincetown, Massachusetts, and receive the 
42 
released prisoners. 
On January 10, 1862, Lord Russell addressed a note to Lord Lyons stating 
that the British government had carefully considered how far Seward's note 
and its concessions complied with the British demand and arrived at the 
conclusion that they constitute the reparation which the British nation 
had a right to expect.43 He also stated that the British government differe 
44 
with Seward on s cme of the conclusions at which he arrived. 
In his reply of January 23, 1862, to Seward, written after the release 
of the prisoners, Russell denied that ambassadors were contraband of war 
40 ~., 254. 
41 Ibid. , 408, quoting Lincoln. 
42 state Papers, 647. 
43 Official Records, 1170. 
44 ~., 1171. 
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subjecting tqe vessel to seizure.45 Seward, as has been stated, had main-
tained the contrary. The case therefore leaves that question exactly as 
it was before. 
The surrenier of the prisoners being placed upon the well settled 
rule, that a captor cannot take out a prize either persons or property 
as contraband without bringing in the vessel for adjudication, unless 
he is necessarily prevented from so doing, the decision settled in this 
respect no new principle of international law. But Lord Russell persisted 
in his original contention, that a belligerent cannot on any pretense take 
46 
persons out of a neutral vessel, thus not merely admitting but insisting 
on what w'e as a nation had claimed for years; this doctrine, therefore, for 
which we had so long contended in vain, must now be considered an estab-
lished rule of international law. 
Several conclusions are apparent from a careful examination of the 
subject. British conservatives who feared the influence of democratic 
liberals like Cobden and Bright, rejoiced when the United states seemed 
to fail in the early years of the Civil War. 
"Seward's great responsibility as Secretary of state was to prevent 
the recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain and France.,,47 To 
45 state Papers, 650. 
46 Ibid., 651. 
47 Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet, Little, Brown, and Company, 
Boston, 1946, 209. Hereafter this work will be referred to as Hendrick. 
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prevent this recognition Seward implanted the idea in the minds of the 
• 
French and British leaders that recognition of the Confederacy meant war 
with the United States. This was how he prevented intervention because he 
knew that Great Britain did not desire war with the United states at this 
time. Lyons and Russell believed that Seward desired a foreign w'ar as a 
way out of the nation's difficulties. As a result of this infonnation, 
his rants and rages against Great Britain take on a new importance. Thus 
Seward accomplished his aim and carried out his responsibility not because 
he was an authority on international law, which he was not, "but because 
he understood human nature. II 48-
The Trent case proved tha. t it is not lawful on the high seas to take 
persons, whatever their character, as prisoners out of a neutral ship which 
has not been judicially proved to have forfeited the benefit of her neutral 
character. 
The four dates most necessary to bear in mind while studying this 
subject are the 16th of November, 1861, when the news of the seizure 
reached Europe; the 12th of December, 1861, when'the extreme seriousness 
of tl)e situation dawned on the American mind through tidings of the British 
excitement and consequent demands; and, finally, the 18th of December, 1861, 
when it became apparent that a decision as to the course to be pursued had 
to be reached within one week by the United states government. 
By his method of presentation in the note Seward put England on the 
48 ~., 210. 
b 
89 
ground of insisting on the rights of neutrals, a matter to which in the 
... 
past Americans had sometimes thought England indifferent. He also placed 
the United states in the proper position regarding her previous utterances 
tOliards the rights of neutrals, and at the same time placed the United 
states in accord with Europe. 
The United states lost a wonderful opportunity by ignoring the advice 
. 
of Montgomery Blair. The position advised by Blair would have indicated 
the confidence we felt in our national power, and the contempt in which 
we held both those whom we called "rebels" and those whom they termed their 
envoys. It would have established our prestige in'the eyes of foreign 
nations. 
Sound reasons were not given for the surrender of Mason and. Slidell 
by Seward. According to James G. Blaine, the doctrine announced by Seward 
, sould not be held on sound principles of international law, and he believed 
that we did not place the restoration of the prisoners upon true ground, 
viz., "that their seizure was in Violation of the principles vthich we could 
not abandon either for a temporary advantage or to save the wounding of 
49 
our national pride." 
Seward's handling of the case as he did, yielded no point of interna-
tional law on which we might at any time desire to rest a claim as 
49 James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, Bell Company, Norwich, 
Connecticut, 1884, I, 585. 
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belligerenti., but made the decision depend on a doctrine and practice 
universally recognized in modern civilized warfare as the only mode of 
treating a prize.50 The note gave due credit to Wilkes for all the quali-
ties which we wished our naval officers to cultivate, and only indirectly 
51 
criticized his leniency. It appeared to follow the doubts suggested 
by Welles as to the possible consequences of Wilkes' failure to bring in 
52 . 
the ~. It showed that the government had from the outset been 
conscious of the weak point of the case. His wording was meant to convey 
the impression that he reached the same conclusions as the British lawyers 
.. ~ which would undoubtedly weaken any criticism from Great Britain. Through 
this surrender because of United states principles, Mason and Slidell were 
to become Britain's "white elephantsu • 53 
50 Lothrop, 313. 
51 Charles F. Adams, "Trent Affair II , American Historical Review, Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1912, XVII, 562. 
52 Lothrop, 213. 
53 .ill£., 318. 
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